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ABSTRACT
Most books and articles written on the philosophy 
of George Berkeley have treated his empiricism. Yet he 
himself explicitly states that his principal concern is 
with spiritual substance. The purpose of this thesis is 
to consider his doctrine on spiritual substance in relation 
to his empiricism and to try to determine whether or not 
these two parts of his philosophy do fit together.
In the introductory chapter the basic tenets of 
his erapiricisraj namely* the rejection of abstract ideas, 
the esse eat peroipi principle, and the rejection of 
material substance, are analysed. These three tenets are 
presupposed in his discussion of spiritual substance and 
hence are a necessary preliminary. Although the arguments 
advanced to prove these teachings are not satisfactory, 
nevertheless these three tenets do blend into one har­
monious position.
The existence of spiritual substances is considered 
next. Berkeley merely asserts the existence of self as a 
spiritual substance without proving it. The existence of 
other finite spirits is dependent on this assertion and 
consequently is not proven. Finally, the existence of 
God depends on the esse est perclpl principle which in 
turn depends on the existence of God.
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Then the activities of spiritual substances, 
namely, sensing, imagining, thinking and willing are 
treated, Ilor© there are many inconsistencies, Berkeley 
does not make clear the precise nature of each faculty 
nor whether the faculties are to be distinguished from 
the substance in which they reside.
It would appear that Berkeley* s empiricism and 
his doctrine on spiritual substanoe, which derives from 
his Christian faith, are not compatible. Following the 
basiq tenets of his empirical philosophy, Berkeley should 
logically have rejected spiritual substance. Since he did 
not he Is faced with problems which his philosophy cannot 
resolve. As a result his empiricism and his Christian 
doctrine on spiritual substance remain as separate parts 
in a philosophy without unity.
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PREFACE
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
notion of spiritual substance in the philosophy of George 
Berkeley. In order to arrive at a clear understanding of the 
meaning of spiritual substance for Berkeley, it will he neces­
sary first to explain certain basic tenets of M s  pMlosophy. 
Accordingly the initial chapter deals with the rejection of 
abstract ideas and of material substance as well as the devel­
opment of the esse est percipi. TMs serves to introduce the 
more positive aspects of his thought having to do with the ex­
istence and nature of spiritual substance, self as opposed to 
other finite spirits, and God the infinite Spirit. Following 
this is a study of the Berkeleyan psychology and episteraology 
of the operations which spiritual substances are said to possess. 
Is tMs doctrine at home in the philosophy of Berkeley? 
Does it not seem paradoxical that an empiricist, who rejects 
material substance, should at the same time maintain a doctrine 
of spiritual substance? This is the problem which is at the 
heart of tMs thesis. Although it pervades the entire thesis, 
tMs problem is considered formally in the concluding chapter.
The critics have not dealt very extensively with the doctrine 
on spiritual substance, even though it is of prime importance 
to the Anglican Bishop of Cloyne, an avowed eneay of skeptics 
and atheists.
ill
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In dealing with this problem, recourse has been made 
primarily to Berkeley’s own text. The pertinent doctrines 
are contained chiefly in the Principles of Human Knowledge 
(1710) and the Three Dialogues Between Hylaa and Philonous 
(1713). Considerable relevant material is to be found also 
in the Philosophical Commentaries (1707-8) and Siris (1744). 
Other works, such as Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher (1732), 
De Motu (1721), the Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision (1709), 
and his private correspondence and sermons, have been used only 
to a very minor extent because they contain very little matter 
germane to this topic. Unfortunately an intended work on spir­
itual substance, which was to have been Part II of the Princi­
ples, was lost in manuscript form by Berkeley himself. And as 
Berkeley wrote in his second letter to Samuel Johnson, the
American Philosopher, ”1 never had leisure since to do so dis-
1
agreeable a thing as writing twice on the same subject.'* There 
is then a difficulty, arising from this regrettable paucity of 
material, in being certain of Berkeley’s exact position on some 
issues.
Secondary sources have provided some illuminating sug­
gestions, as well as a better general understanding of Berke­
ley’s philosophy. For the most part material from the sec­
ondary sources has not been included in the body of the dis­
sertation, but rather has been restricted to the footnotes.
The standard works on Berkeley have been consulted, as have
 1------------------------------------------------------------
Luce-Jessop, Vol. II, p. 282
iv
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more specialized studies pertaining to the present topic.
Such specialized studies are, however, not very plentiful. 
Finally the more recent periodical articles on Berkeley have 
been employed.
All references to the writings of Bishop Berkeley are 
from The Works of Greorge Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne. edited by 
A. A. luce and T. 1. dessop, (London, Thomas Helson and Sons 
Ltd., 1948-1957}. Berkeley almost invariably followed the 
practice of numbering his paragraphs, and accordingly refer­
ences have been given first to his own paragraph number and 
then in brackets to the volume and page of the Luce-Jessop 
edition, e.g. Brine., Part I, par. 10, (II, 45) refers to par­
agraph 10 of Part I of the Principles, which appears on page 
45 of Volume II of the Luee-Jessop edition.
The Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phllonous do not 
have any paragraph division, and only the reference to the luce 
Jessop edition has been given, e.g. Mai., II, 233, refers to 
page 233 of Volume II of this edition. The Philosophical 
Commentaries are referred to as P.O. and Alciphron as Ale. In 
reference to the letters or sermons, the number of the letter 
or sermon is given, and then the volume and page of the Luee- 
Jessop edition in brackets.
I wish to express my thanks to Dr. John Deck who has 
very carefully examined my manuscript and offered many help­
ful suggestions. My thanks are due also to Mr. Patrick Flood
who has been instrumental in imparting to me the background
v
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knowledge of modem philosophy without which I could not 
have undertaken this dissertation. I wish to acknowledge 
my indebtedness also to the members of the Philosophy De­
partments of the University of St. Michael’s College and of 
Assumption University of Windsor, who have been responsible 
for my philosophical instruction. Finally a word of appre­
ciation to Miss Pauline Stellman and Mrs. Helen Haberer for 
the many hours they have spent in typing this dissertation.
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IBASIC TEHBTS OF REHKBLEY*S PHILOSOPHY
To begin in mediae res may indeed be admirable in 
the epic but it is hardly to be recommended in a philo­
sophical dissertation. Accordingly the discussion shall 
begin with certain basic positions in the philosophy of 
Berkeley, which must be understood before spiritual sub­
stance can be treated. The rejection of abstract ideas 
must be taken as the starting point in any consideration of 
Berkeley’s thought. For he invokes this doctrine, which he 
believes he has firmly established, throughout the whole 
gamut of his work, Appropriately then, he deals with the 
problem of abstract ideas in the "Introduction" to his major 
philosophical work, The Principles of Human Knowledge.
Berkeley begins by observing that abstract ideas 
occupy a considerable amount of time said writings among phi­
losophers. These philosophers among whom "the scholastics"
  r    ---------------------------------
Princ. Introd. par. 1-25 (II, 25-40). The "First 
Draft of the Introduction to the Principles" is found in 
Vol. II, p. 121-145. The two versions are substantially the 
same, as the editors, A. A. luce and T. B. Jessop, point out, 
"Compared with the printed Introduction, the draft neither 
adds nor omits anything of substance." (II, 117) Vide etlam 
0. J. Wamock, Berkeley (Pelican Books, Baltimore, 1553), 
p. 58.
1
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2and Locke^ are mentioned, tell us we can form abstract ideas 
of qualities such as extension, colour etc., even of man, 
body and "more compound beings’* of this sort. But Berkeley 
sardonically adds, "Whether others have this wonderful fac­
ulty of abstracting their ideas they best can tells for my 
self I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or repre­
senting to my self the ideas of those particular things I have
3
perceived and of variously compounding and dividing them.**
Here we have a lucid statement of Berkeley’s own posi­
tion on forming abstract ideas. He only knows, or has ideas 
of, concrete things which he perceived through his senses. He 
can combine these ideas and form ideas of such things as phoe­
nix or unicorn of which he actually has no sense impression. 
But he denies that he can form an idea of colour, man, etc., 
which abstracts from all particulars. The idea of man must 
be of some colour, size, age, etc. Berkeley seems to make no 
distinction between an idea and a sense image. He does, it 
is true, distinguish objects of sense and objects of imagi­
nation, which we shall treat at length in the third chapter, 
but this distinction is not relevant to our present discus­
sion. A sense image of man perspicuously must be of a certain
 g---------------------------------------------------------------
Berkeley usually ealls them ’the Schoolmen" and 
refers to their abstraction in the Brine., Introd. par, 17. 
(II, 35)? to locks, ibid., par. 11-IT, (II, W W ).
3
Brine.. Introd., par. 10, (II, 29), of. N.T.V. 
par. 122,"H7“220TT"^
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3colour, size, shape, etc., but it might be argued that an
intellectual idea can prescind from these sense impressions
and form an abstract idea. Berkeley does not hare an answer
to an objection based on this distinction of sense image and
idea because he appear® to be completely unaware of such a 
4
distinction.
He does, however, admit that we can abstract in one
sense,-* that is, we can separate some particular parts or
qualities from others with which they are united in some
object. But this is only possible if they may really exist
thus separated. Such a form of abstraction, as is patent,
is not really a concession on Berkeley's part, for it does
not in any way involve the forming of abstract ideas.
In direct refutation of Locke, Berkeley challenges
the reader to try and form an idea of a triangle which is
"neither oblique, nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural,
7
nor sealenon, but all and none of these at once." Clearly
 1   -------------------------------------
Cf. J. J. Laky, A Study of Berkeley's Philosophy 
in the Light of the Philosophy 6f~lh. Miomas Aquinas. 
^Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1950). 
Laky points out, p. 121, that Berkeley "confuses imagination 
and intellect."
5
Prlnc., Introd., par. 10, (II, 29).
6
This is what is called abstraction in some intell­
igence tests.
7.
Brine.. Introd.. par. 13, (II, 32f). The Text In 
Locke reads as follows: "Does it not reuire some pains and 
skill to fora the general idea of a triangle? (Which is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4Berkeley confuses idea in this case with visual image which 
obviously cannot abstract from the particulars enumerated. 
Looked at, however, from the point of view of Locke who 
admits the difficulty of framing abstract ideas, and who 
states that this process involves the putting together of
8inconsistent parts, Berkeley’s criticism is indeed telling. 
Locke, it is true, remains vague on the meaning of framing 
an abstract idea, but unless he too confuses image and con­
cept, then it is difficult to make any sense of his doctrine 
of abstract ideas.
An obvious objection to this rejection of abstract 
ideas is the assertion that it would destroy all science.
When, for example, you take a particular triangle in Geometry 
and prove some theorem using it, you would not be able to gen­
eralize and make a universal judgment. Berkeley parries this 
attack by saying that when we use a particular triangle, it 
is used as an example; we do not attend to the particulars of 
the triangle in the proof, and hence the proof will stand for 
all triangles. Bar we can consider a figure merely as trian­
gular without considering the size of the angles or lines.^
yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive and difficult.) 
For it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equi­
lateral, equicrural, nor sealenon, but all or none of these 
at once,11 John Locke, An 5ssay Concerning Human Underatanding 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 18^) X. C. Frazer ed.T^W. IY, Ch. 7, 
sec. 9, (Vol. II, p. 274).
8
Ibid.
9
Princ., Introd., par. 16, (II, 35).
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5We can abstract thus far, Berkeley admits, but this is not 
to frame Han abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangleH. 
But what, one may ask, is the difference between considering 
a figure as triangular Mid framing an abstract idea of a tri­
angle? Surely to consider a figure as triangular is to ab­
stract from the particulars of shape, size, colour, etc., and 
hence to frame an abstract idea,^
The source of the prevailing notion of abstract ideas, 
Berkeley thinks, is language. Bach word is said to have one
precise and settled signification and the only purpose of
11language is the communication of ideas. ait as Berkeley 
12points out, it is not necessary that significant names 
excite in the understanding the ideas for which they stand
--------- IS------------------------------------------------------------
Wamock agrees with Berkeley on this issue "We 
may agree with him j. Berkeley] that a general discourse about 
lines may refer to a particular line used as an example, 
and need not be conceived to be about some entity other than 
actual lines, an ’abstract line’ or the ’abstract idea* of 
Line.* p. 71, What Warnock says is quite true, but he misses 
the point to some extent. Abstract ideas are a means of 
knowing things, but not what we know. Science does deal 
with real things but this does not exclude the employment of 
abstract ideas.
11
Locke, Essay, Bk. Ill, Ch. 10, sec. 23, (Vol. II, 
p. 142), M,..the ends of language in our discourse with others, 
being chiefly these threes First, to make known one man’s 
thought or ideas to another: Secondly, to do it with as much 
ease and quickness as is possibles and, Thirdly, thereby to 
convey the knowledge of things.**
12
Brine». Introd., par, 20, (II, 37).
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6every time they are used. For example, in Algebra, we do 
not always need to advert to the particular quantity marked 
by a certain letter used as a symbol.
Moreover, for Berkeley, the communication of ideas 
is not the chief nor the only end of language. Other ends 
would include the raising of some passion or emotion, the 
exciting to or deterring from an action, the putting of the 
mind in some particular disposition. In such eases there is 
no need for abstract ideas. In this argument, Berkeley has 
only tried to show that abstract ideas are not as important 
as some thinkers would have us believe. It is not, nor is 
it intended to be, an apodictic demonstration that there are 
no abstract ideas.
*What created intelligence will pretend to conceive 
that which Sod cannot cause to be? How it is on all hands 
agreed, that nothing abstract or general can be made really 
to exist, whence it should seem to follow, that it cannot
13
have so much as an ideal existence in the understanding.* 
This argument of Berkeley against abstract idea manifests 
a rather confused idea of being. When he speaks of God 
causing something to be, Berkeley seems to mean to be a 
particular concrete thing. Consequently, to say that Sod 
cannot cause it to be in this sense, is no argument against 
. 53
"KLrst Draft of the Introduction*, II, 125,
Vide supra, note 1, page 1,
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7the reality of abstract ideas. Against the ideal existence 
of abstract ideas in the mind, Berkeley does not seem to 
give any reason in this passage, although perhaps his 
equating of thing and idea is foreshadowed. In that case, 
the real existence of the concrete thing and its ideal 
existence in the mind would be identical. But more of this 
identity later.
**I approve of this axiom of the schoolemen nihil 
est in intellectu quod non prius fuit in sensu, I wish 
they had stuck to it it had never taught them the Doctrine 
of Abstract I d e a s . T h e  way in which this axiom Is under­
stood by Berkeley constitutes an objection to the doctrine 
of abstract ideas. Once again this is due to having the 
product of the intellect identical with the sense image. The 
intellect does not go beyond this Image to a concept which 
is free of such sense limitations; hence the axiom thus in­
terpreted supports Berkeley’s rejection of abstract ideas.
 u ----------------------------------------------------------
P.O. par. 779* (I* 94). The punctuation, capit­
alization etc. are irregular in this early fragmentary work. 
Wild points out that we cannot quote isolated sections of 
the P.O. as representing Berkeley’s views, John Wild,
George Berkeley: A Study of His Life and Philosophy
"(Sambridge, Mass.,~Harvard~Wnfversi*ty tress’, l93'S5,P - 14.
A. A. luce also gives this warning, although he points out 
that *the final views expressed in these notebooks are, I 
think in entire agreement with the published doctrine of 
the Principles’*. A. A. Luce, Berkeley1 s Imaaterialism.
(Nelson and Sons, London, 1945), p. 6.
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8Berkeley also claims the common man to his side.
”fhe generality of men which are simple and illiterate
IBnever pretend to abstract notions#”  ^ He does not make any 
effort to back up this statement except in terms of Locke’s 
thought# Por Locke had said that abstract ideas are diffi-
ig
cult to frame and require study and effort, so, as Berke­
ley puts it, "We may, therefore, reasonably conclude that 
if such there be fthat is, abstract ideas J they are alto­
gether confin’d to the learned,” But this is hardly to be 
urged against Locke since his very characterization of ab­
stract ideas would make the opinion of the generality of 
men irrelevant# Surely if abstract ideas are very diffi­
cult and require study, then the claim that the common man 
does not have them, does not constitute any objection to 
their existence# On the other hand, against those who do 
not accept Locke’s version of abstract ideas as being so 
difficult to frame, Berkeley’s claim remains an unsupported 
assumption. In this argument Berkeley seems to be trying,
15 ! ‘
” First Draft of the Introd.”, II, 125*
16
Locke, An Essay gone. Hum# Und., Bk. IT., Oh. 7, 
sec. 9* (Vol II, p. 274}* wl’Kus particular ideas are first 
received and distinguished and so knowledge got about them; 
and next to them the less general or less specific, which 
are next to particular* for, abstract ideas are not so 
obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind, as 
particular ones# If they seem so to grown men, It is only 
because by constant and familiar use they are made sot for 
when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general 
ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry 
difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves 
as we are apt to imagine.”
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as the old cliche puts it, **to eat his cake and have it too".
The appeal to having established definitely and con­
clusively that there are no abstract ideas will follow 
through the remainder of Berkeley’s philosophy. Although 
he uses his teaching to prove virtually everything in his 
thought, yet we could not 3ay that his philosophy stands or 
falls with the success or failure of his endeavour to sub­
stantiate this doctrine. For Berkeley is not merely a man 
of one argument.
While the rejection of abstract ideas is the most 
basic position in Berkeley’s thought, the esse est percipi 
is the statement for which the M 3hop of Oloyne is best 
known. MFor as to what is said of the absolute existence of 
unthinking things without any relation to their being per­
ceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is 
percipi. nor is it possible they should have any existence 
out of the minds of thinking things which perceive them.”1^  
Hence we have an account of his most distinctive doctrine.
The existence of sensible things consists in their 
being perceived, or, in other words, when speaking of sen­
sible things to exist and to be perceived are synonymous.
An absolute existence apart from being perceived is flatly 
denied. Yet it is wan opinion strangely prevailing amongst
~ --------------- 37------------------------------------------ - --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frinc.» part I, par. 3, (II, 42).
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10
men*, as Be rice ley himself admits, that things do have a 
real existence outside the mind or distinct from being per­
ceived. The root of this opinion is abstract ideas, which
18were fostered by the schoolmen. Bit nothing could be 
more abstract, Berkeley informs us, than to consider the 
existence of sensible things apart from their being per­
ceived. It is impossible to conceive a sensible thing dis­
tinct from our sensation or perception of it. The two can­
not exist apart and hence we cannot abstract one from the 
other. Clearly the force of Berkeley*s argument here de­
pends on the rejection of abstract ideas, the proof of which
■jo
we have already shown to be doubtful*
— ----- 15---------------------------------------------------------------
P.O. par. 725, (I, 88). *H.B. That not common 
usage but the Schools coined the Word existence supposed to 
stand for an abstract general Idea,*
19
Other authors have pointed out Berkeley’s failure 
to distinguish the act of sensation frora its object as an 
objection to the ease est percipi principle. Tide J. J. laky, 
p. 121; Wamoek, p. i;4W~£~T7 Ayer, The Pound'ations of 
Empirical Knowledge. (London, MacMillan and So. ltd*,~T947), 
p. o4i.Ayer, although he agrees ultimately with Berkeley, 
states the objection clearly. "However the philosophers 
who maintain this distinction between act and objeet in their 
analysis of sensation do not, for the most part, desire 
merely to call attention to an empirical matter of fact, They 
consider the distinction to be philosophically important 
because they think they can use it to refute Berkeleyan 
idealism, Wor, according to Berkeley, colour and shapes and 
sound and all other "sensible qualities* are mind-dependent, 
inasmuch as their existence consists in their being perceived, 
and since material things are, In his view, nothing but 
collections of sensible qualities, he concludes that they too 
cannot exist apart from a perceiving mind. But here, it is 
argued, he falls into error through failing to distinguish 
between the objeet of a sensation and the act. Acts of 
sensation, it is said, are indeed mind-dependent; but it
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
11
But Berkeley does not depend on this one argument
to support his favourite teaching. He takes the same epis-
temologieal point de depart as Locke and Descartes before
him, that is, he begins with the knowledge of ideas rather 
20than things. Yet unlike both Locke and Descartes, Berke-
21ley does not try to get out of his mind. He makes no 
reference to this starting point of Locke and Descartes, 
which we might call idealist-in-tendency, because he was so 
imbued with Cartesianism as to be unaware of any other
does not follow their objects are? for there is no good 
ground for supposing that the object of a sensation cannot 
exist apart from the act.*
20
J. Collins, A History of Modem European Philos­
ophy (Bruce, Milwaukee, 1959)»p. 3 SB, points out that 
Berkeley accepts what he calls the *mentalist starting point 
of Descartes and Locke.*
21
Locke, An Essay Cone. Hum. Und., Bk. IT, Ch. 1, 
sec. 1, (II, 167). * Since t he mind, in'all its thoughts and 
reasonings hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, 
which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that 
our knowledge is only conversant about them*. Yet Locke 
does speak of "external sensible objects* which do not exist 
only in the mind. Logically such objects will have to be 
unknowable and Berkeley wished to avoid this position. 
Descartes In his Hedit.ationea de Prima Philosophia. Oeuvres 
de Descartes, edited by 'C. Adam an<S P. Tannery (laris, Cerf, 
w r a x o j ,  notably in Meditatio III, (Vol. VII, p. 34-52) 
says that he is a thinking thing and then he proceeds from 
the ideas he has in his mind to prove the existence of God. 
Then in Meditatio VI, (Vol. VII, p. 71—39) he goes on to 
prove the existence of the external world. We should note 
that he looks at his ideas while still in doubt of the ex­
istence of any extramental reality. On Berkeley's remaining 
within his own mind Vide Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical 
Experience. (Hew York", Charles Scribner'1 s Sons, 1937), p.l96f.
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12
possible point of departure. But he is more vigorously 
logical in deriving conclusions from this beginning than 
were his predecessors. If, originally, we know only our 
own sensations or ideas, then the so-called external objects 
would be unknowable; we are involved in skepticism* W© are 
limiting our knowledge to appearances and positing an unknow­
able something beyond them. Kant admitted the inaccessibili­
ty of the thing-in-itself, but developed Locke in a direction 
which avoided complete skepticism by postulating subjective 
categories in the mind. Hence what we know are phenomena, a 
tertium quid, with the matter supplied by the thing and the 
form by our own understanding.
Such a constructive knowledge, however, would not be 
satisfactory to Berkeley. He desires something more In line 
with common sense, more realistic. He brings Locke to a log­
ical conclusion in another direction, which also overcomes 
the skepticism which Locke had avoided only at the expense 
of being Inconsistent, of failing to carry his principles 
through to their radical ending, fhere is, for Berkeley, no 
unknowable something; things and ideas are equated. When we 
know our sensations or ideas, we know sensible things, not 
just their appearances; we know them as they are in them­
selves.
Hence in the Philosophical Commentaries he writes,
*According to my doctrine all things are entia rationis i.e. 
solum habent esse in Intellectu.’* And in the next paragraph,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
13
“According to ay doctrine all are not entia rationis. The
distinction between ens rLonis fsicJ and ens reale is kept
2?up by it as well as any other Doctrine.* At first sight 
there appears to be a direct contradiction and possibly that 
is the correct interpretation of these passages. Perhaps 
Berkeley is correcting the first passage and deliberately 
contradicting it in the second entry. However it may be mere­
ly a carelessness in terminology and possibly we can harmonize 
the two quotations.
Sensible things do exist only in the mind— on this 
point Berkeley is most emphatic. But that existence is a real 
existence and can be distinguished from the purely mental ex­
istence of things which cannot exist* Such things are con-
23tradictory and although we can speak of them, they can have 
no existence— the prime example, for Berkeley, being abstract 
ideas, The entia rationis could also refer to things which 
are objects of our imagination but not sensible things. It 
does seem quite possible then that the entia rationis is the
P.O., par. 474» 474a (I, 59). The two quotations
above constitute two complete successive entries which are not 
connected with the paragraphs immediately preceding or follow­
ing them*
23
J. P. de 0. Day, “George Berkeley 1685-1753“, The
Review of Metaphysics* VI, (1952-1953), p. 267, remarks that
Berkeley confuses logical impossibility with psychological 
impossibility, that is, what is inconceivable with what is 
unimaginable. Such criticism seems to be sound, the confusion 
being a result of the failure to distinguish adequately between 
the intellect and the imagination. Of. Semantics and Necessary 
Truths An Inquiry into the Foundation of An'alytTcai Philosophy, 
(New Haven, Tale [Ini vers I ty Press, 19 5^ 7, p. 81
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second passage (P.O. par. 474a) refers to one of these pos­
sibilities or perhaps to both. But if Berkeley is to be 
entirely consistent he would not even call the contra­
dictions such as abstract ideas, entia rationis for he de­
nied not only real but also ideal existence to them.
In a rather involved debate in the Three Dialogues
24
Between Bylas and Philonous. Berkeley argues against the 
independent existence of sensible thing3. The argument is 
based on the definition of sensible things being those im­
mediately perceived by sense. Such a definition could, as
23 ' :
Mai., II, 174-189. Warnoek describes the two argu­
ments in this portion of the first dialogue very clearly; ”He 
uses arguments of two different kinds. In some cases he tries 
to show by direct argument that some of .-hat we call ’sensible 
qualities’ actually are sensations; in others, he uses the 
’argument from illusion* in an attempt to show that certain 
qualities are hot *in* objects and so (he assumes) must be 
*in the mind*. ... The first group of arguments relies on the 
point that many qualities of things are often said to be 
♦pleasant* or *disagreeable *, sometimes even ’painful*. We 
say that a fire is pleasantly warm; that if one gets too close 
it feels painfully hot; that vinegar is disagreeably bitter. 
Berkeley quite wrongfully proceeds to identify the pleasant of 
painful heat of a fire with the pleasant or painful feelings 
that people have in its proximity, the bitterness of' vinegar 
with the disagreeable sensations of one who tastes it; and he 
concludes that these ’sensible qualities* are ’sensations’.
But this Is obviously a confusion. The fire's ’quality* of 
being pleasantly warm is not a sensation, but rather what a 
fire is said to have which does, or would, occasion pleasant 
feelings of warmth in normally sensitive people who do not 
get too close to it. The second, group of arguments trades 
on the fact that objects sometimes seem different to different 
observers in different conditions... He asserts in the course 
of his arguments that if some property were ’really Inherent* 
in an object, the object would necessarily appear to have that 
property in all circumstances... unless this fantastic assumpt­
ion is made, the ’argument from illusion* cannot get started.” 
pp. 151-153.
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is evident, be taken in a realist manner. But for Berkeley 
it means that the reality of the sensible thing consists in 
its being perceived. This enables Berkeley to make the 
seemingly realist statement that we know things— but "things* 
are ideas, Once this starting point, that is, the definition 
of sensible things as the Bishop of Cloyne understands it, is 
accepted, the distinction between thing and idea is impossible 
to maintain.
We must note, however, that the starting point itself 
is given an arbitrary interpretation which tends toward ide­
alism. The radical position, that is, the esse est percipi. 
which is necessary to avoid skepticism, would be enough to 
render one suspicious of this interpretation of the defini­
tion of sensible things. What Berkeley really assumes is 
that we know our sensations rather than things; he does not 
actually prove this. Or perhaps we should say that he offers
a sophistical argument, namely, that to say that we know
2*5things is to say that things are in our mind.  ^ But the 
things in our mind are ideas and it is, therefore, these ideas 
which we know. One could object that ideas are not what we 
know but rather the means by which we know things.2  ^ Berkeley
------- 25---------------------------1-------------------
Brine., Part I, par. 6, (II, 43).
26
Laky, p. 121, observes Berkeley’s failure to make 
this distinction. "For him ideas are the id quod and not the 
id quo, thus confusing the how of knowing wTth the what of 
Knowing.*
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is not actually very concerned with proving this point which 
he probably did not expect to be questioned, embedded firmly 
as he was in the Cartesian tradition of his time.
When Berkeley appeals to the reader to consider in
his own mind, **the absolute existence of sensible objects in
27themselves or without the mind.H and see if it is not a 
direct contradiction, his case once again rests on a Cartesian 
foundation. It is so manifestly a contradiction to himself 
that he feels any fair-minded reader calmly considering this 
abstract idea cannot fail to agree with him. The truth of
the esse est percipi is so obvious to Berkeley that he scarce-
28ly takes any pains to prove it.
For two reasons he prefers the term Hidea” to thing”, 
even though both are used synonymously. First, the term 
thing” is more comprehensive and could refer to spirits or 
thinking things as well as to ideas, the latter being only 
identical with sensible things, ”Idea”, then, should have a 
precise technical meaning in Berkeley, although unfortunately 
he does not remain faithful to this signification at all
Brine,. Part I, par, 24, (II, 51).
28
Warnock, p, 145, is struck by Berkeley’s certitude 
on this issue, ”Tdeas, he repeatedly insists,exist ’only in 
the mind *; they exist only when they are actually perceived; 
’Their being is to be perceived or known*. This too, at the 
very outset of his argument, he declares to be ’evident*, 
the contrary ’plainly repugnant’. He seems to think that his 
assertion stands in no need of explanation or defense.”
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times.
Closely allied with his esse est peroipi principle
is the rejection of matter or material substance. In the
Three Dialogues Between Hyias and Philonous. commencing
with sensible things as those immediately perceived by
sense, Berkeley argues, through his spokesman Philonous,
that we only know sensible qualities. Prom which it follows
that, “sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many
sensible qualities or combinations of sensible qualities.**^0
These sensible qualities, whose existence is to-be-perceived,
exist in the mind* The material substratum said to underlie
these qualities is not itself perceived immediately, and
31hence is not sensible. Hylas, the straw man, who is in
favour of material substance, tries to explain what he means
by substance supporting its accidents, but finds that he is 
unable to do so. In fact, Hylas discovers that even apart
22 .    —
For the most part Berkeley does restrict his use 
of the word “idea1* to his own technical meaning. However, he
is a little careless on occasion, e.g. P.O., par. 887,
(I, 104}i Brine.. Part I, par. 140, (II, 105).
30
Dial.. II, 175.
31
Hylas represents a point of view which is basically 
Lockean, thus giving Berkeley an excellent opportunity to de­
velop his thought against the background of a popular philoso­
phy of the day. Moreover because of his empirical idealism, 
Locke * s philosophy furnishes an admirable point of departure 
for Berkeley. The name Hylas is too similar to the Greek word 
for matter, hyie. to be a coincidence. There might also be a
play on the Greek word, hylao, meaning ’bark* or *bayV.
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from not ha-ring a proper idea of matter, since it is not per­
ceived by senses, we do not have any understanding of matter.
We have no idea of it, using the term “idea” in a more gener­
al sense. Philonous now charges that the proof should lie 
with the one who holds the affirmative side. Since Hylas can­
not support his position, there is no reason to cling to it.
Moreover matter or material substance is an abstract
32
idea and consequently is to be cast off on this ground also.
For the acceptance of matter leads us to posit an unknown 
and unknowable something which is really what Locke did.^
But such a position is skeptical and Berkeley wants to avoid 
skepticism at all costs, fo maintain this old idea of the 
existence of material substance in view of a point of depar­
ture which is idealist-in-tendency is indeed difficult to do. 
Berkeley is once again bringing Locke to a logical conclusion, 
an extreme one which the moderate Englishman would never
22 -
M. 0. Beardley, “Berkeley on *Abstract Ideas*M,
Mind. Vol. Ill, p* 157, does not think that this argument is 
valid. **!he doctrine of abstract Ideas furnishes no real support 
to Berkeley’s argument against the existence of material sub­
stance independent of perception.** Ihe reason for this opinion 
is not made clear in the article.
33
Locke. Essay Gone. Hum. Hnd.. Be. II. ch. 23. sec 4. 
(Yol. I, p. 336) , ’HTel because" we cannot conceive how they 
£I.e. sensible qualitiesJ should subsist alone, nor one in 
another, we suppose them existing in, and supported by, some 
common subject; which support we denote by the name ’substance*, 
though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that 
thing we suppose a support.1*
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accept.
Of course, Berkeley does not feel he is going against 
common sense or the ordinary people. He is only rejecting the 
philosophical sense of “material substance*, “which in effect 
is no sense." The ordinary man, who has not "been tainted by 
the abstract jargon of the philosophers, only understands by 
corporeal substance, "Bulk, Solidity & such like sensible 
qualitys £alaj,* In other words, Berkeley claims to be in 
line with the thinking of the common man with regard to the 
meaning of material substance. The value of his argument here 
seems open to question; "material substance* is a technical 
philosophic term and it seems to be begging the question merely 
to assert that ordinary men regard things only as so many sen­
sible qualities.
It is doubtful if they have any opinion at all on such 
a topic. How could an ordinary man who has no philosophical 
background even discuss this issue? His very use of words 
will differ from that of philosophers, which if not radically 
different, will at least be more refined and precise. There­
fore it seems necessary that we first express the thoughts of 
the ordinary man in philosophical language before we can dis­
cuss his opinion. The possibility of doing this is certainly 
open to dispute,
34 ^
Laky, p. 41, notes that Berkeley overcomes the flaws 
in Locke* "With a keener and more logical mind than Locke * s, 
he successfully opposed the inconsistencies and contradictions 
in Locke*8 system",
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Again within the Cartesian framework, Berkeley takes 
up the distinction between primary and secondary qualities 
to support his case. Locke gives the classical expression 
for this distinction in his assay Concerning Human Under­
standing*^ Primary qualities are those Hutterly insepa­
rable from the body*, that is, in such a manner that they 
remain in the body in all changes and in every particle of 
matter. These qualities are extension, solidity, figure, 
motion, or rest and number* Secondary qualities such as 
colour, odour, temperature, etc., are themselves nothing in 
the objects but powers to produce various sensations in us.
In brief, the primary qualities really exist in bodies, the 
secondary do not.
The primary qualities then are said to exist in mat­
ter out3ide of the mind, but not the secondary. They do not 
exist in matter because of their variability. Hence some­
thing at a distance may appear different in colour, or under 
a microscope or to a person with jaundice it appears differ­
ent and so on. All colours then are only apparent and none 
of those we perceive are really inherent in any outward ob­
ject. The same argument is intended to apply, mutatis 
mutandis, with regard to odours, sounds, etc.
Thus far Berkeley and Locke are in agreement, but
Berkeley Is not satisfied to stop here. There is, he claims, 
  -------------------------------------------------------------
Bfc. II, Ch. 1, secs. 9, 10, 15, (I, 270-278, 296- 
301), This distinction is found in Descartes, Brlneipia 
Philosophiae, I, 53? IV, 193-199, (Vol. VIII, p. 25? 321- 
32$). Cf. Berkeley, Dial.. II, 187f.
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no real "basis for the distinction between primary and sec­
ondary qualities. Berkeley uses the same argument against 
primary qualities. Thus the extension of a thing appears 
different at various distances or to take a more extreme 
example, the extension of a sensible thing would appear 
niusri greater to a mite than to a man. rtThere is no exten­
sion or figure in our object because to one eye it shall 
seem little, smooth and round, when at the same time it 
appears to the other eye, great uneven and angular.**
This whole line of argumentation may, at first 
sight, appear weak and even frivolous, but we must try to 
put ourselves into the whole atmosphere of thought in which 
Berkeley is immersed. Once you admit sensible qualities are 
those immediately perceived by sense, according to Berkeley*s 
interpretation of this phrase, then the force of the argument 
becomes apparent. The application to primary qualities no 
less than to secondary qualities is equally manifest,
Locke described the primary qualities as those with­
out which we cannot conceive an object. But even this is an 
abstraction since we cannot, in Berkeley*s terns, think of 
an extended thing which is of no colour, shape, etc. In 
other words the thing with only its primary qualities is 
still an abstract idea, and idea which we cannot form.
Dial., II, 189.
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As has “been seen, Berkeley’s establishment of this tenet
against Locke’s doctrine is unanswerable.
But the greatest objection to positing the actual
existence of primary qualities in the material substance is
that such a position entails the acceptance of the absolute
existence of sensible things, ”And is not this a direct
37
repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?” Even if it were
possible for material substance to exist without the mind,
it would be unknowable. By our senses we only know what we
perceive and we clearly do not perceive any material
substratum. Furthermore, we need not suppose the existence
of matter to explain how our ideas are caused. In fact, the
’’materialist” cannot explain how body can act upon spirit
38and produce ideas. If matter did exist, then Sod would
have created innumerable beings for no reason at all. Locke’s
description of the world, in Berkeley’s opinion would involve 
 ■■-. " "         —       ---
J. A. Brunton, ”Berkeley and the External World”, 
Philosophy 28 (October 1957) p. 325-341, is convinced that 
the absolute existence of non-thinking things is a contra­
diction. But he says further that he cannot prove this to 
anyone who does not see it as a contradiction. A, A, Luce, 
p. 22 who is a convinced ”immaterialist”, defends Berkeley 
and points out that ”he so denied matter as to affirm the 
sensible”. Pap, p. 162m writes: ”Berkeley only denied a 
philosophical theory with regard to the nature of material 
objects not that there are material objects.”
38
The problem of the interaction of mind and body 
was introduced by the dualism of Descartes, He had recourse 
to the rather facile explanation that the pineal gland was 
the point of interaction. His successors, Kalebranehe, 
Spinoza and Leibniz all struggled with this problem.
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needless duplication* In any case we could never know its 
existence, even if it did exist.
All of Berkeley’s arguments involve either the re­
jection of abstract ideas or the esse est peroipi« or both, 
nevertheless within his own frame of reference and partic­
ularly taking up the positions of Locke and thinking them 
through to their logical though bizarre conclusions, Berke­
ley does argue cogently. Locke's only possible appeal would 
be to common sense but such an objection is surely not philo­
sophical, nor could Locke's own thought be aptly called a 
philosophy of common sense.
In spite of his Idealism, Berkeley does still claim 
39to be a realist. "The question between the materialists
and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of
the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an
absolute existence, distinct from being perceived by God and
exterior to all minds. Sensible things really exist
apart from my perceiving them, but still their esse is
percipl; the idealism remains, only very slightly obfuscated.
Hence Berkeley can make what appears at first sight to be a
straightforward realist statement, e.g., HI question not the 
     ---------
Claude Arnold in an unpublished dissertation The 
lotion of Substance in Bishop Berkeley (The University of 
e^stern'lIn'iarloV T35T7 p.' 44, makes the observation that 
Berkeley's doctrine is analogous to Aristotelian realism 
because of the Identification of "ideas" and "real things",
40
Mai., II, 235.
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existence of anything that we perceive by the senses.1*^ 1 
But since existence is defined as being perceived, any such 
statements about the real world cannot lose their essential­
ly idealist east.
Because Berkeley said that things are independent of 
all finite perceivers and exist in the Divine Mind, he was 
accused of holding that we see all things in God. He objects 
to this arraignment and specifically mentions that he is dis­
pleased at being ranked with Malebranche on this point.^ 
Malebranche holds for an absolute external world, but one
which is knowable only by revelation. Our senses for him are
43not reliable and cannot assure us of its existence. Berkeley,
------- 41------------------- - ---------------------------
Letter 12, (VIII, 37). Vide etiaia P.O., par. 312,
(I, 38); Brine., paid; I, par. 33, (Tl, $4).
42
Letter^l4, (VIII, 41). J. B, Jessop, "Malebranche 
and Berkeley", Revue Internationale de Philosophie I (1938- 
1939), p. 138f., agrees with Berkeley1^  protestations on this 
point "When system is compared with system, both contents and 
principles are deeply different. Berkeley was certainly right 
in repudiating any genuine similarity between his doctrine and 
Malebranche1s*. On the specific issue of sense he writes "Bor 
Berkeley the veracity of sense is as fundamental as its inve­
racity for Malebranche". But A. D. Fritz, "Malebranche and the 
Immaterialisa of Berkeley*, fhe Review of Metaphysics III (1949)) 
pp. 59-80, believes that Berkeley is botS’ metaphysically and 
episteaologieally dependent on Malebranche.
43
Nicole Malebranche, Bntretiens sur la Metaphysique et 
sur la Religion, edition critique de ArmandOuvilier. u. Vrln. 
H F i s T i P T T W ,  v, (II, I87f,) "II n’ya done point d * autre 
vole que la revelation qui puisse nous assurer, que Dieu a bien 
voulu creer des corps; suppose' neanmoins ce dont vous ne doutez 
plus, spavoir qu*ils ne sont point visibles par eux-mernes, 
qu’ils ne peuvent agir dans notre esprit, ni se representer a
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on the other hand, taking a more reasonable stand, knows of 
the existence of the sensible v/orld and the nature of sensi­
ble tilings through his perception of this world. It is true 
that God constantly affects hims with all the sensible impres­
sions he perceives since sensible things themselves are purely
passive and cannot affect him. But this is not to say that we
44
see all things in the Divine Hind, as Malebranche holds. 
Berkeley finds this doctrine incomprehensible.
We have treated three key ideas in the philosophy of 
George Berkeley, namely, the rejection of abstract ideas, the 
esse est percipl. and the rejection of material substance. 
These constitute the backdrop for the main attraction, the 
realm of the spirit, God and finite minds. The understanding 
of these three basic doctrines is presupposed in the discus­
sion of spiritual substance.
lui j et que notre esprit lui-meme ne peut les oonno£tre que 
dans les idees qui les representent, ni les sentir que par 
des modalitez ou des sentiments, dont ils ne peuvent etre la 
cause, q u 'en consequence des loix arbitralres de 1 ’union de 
1*ame et du corps.H
44
Ibid., VTII, xii, (II, 250f,); Malebranche*s own
Taption t o Bniretien II reads MHous pouvons voir en lui DieuJ toutes choses...n (I, 85).
57379 
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THB EXISTENCE OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES
When Berkeley speaks of spiritual substance, soul, 
mind, or spirit, all of which words he uses synonymously,^  
he introduces a new technical term, "notion*. Actually 
the term does not appear until the second edition of the
Principles of Human Knowledge, as is pointed out In the
2
editor's Introduction to this work, but only the word it­
self Is new, not that for which It stands.
As we saw, ideas are equated with sensible things, 
that is, with the things that we perceive with our senses.
We do not perceive spiritual substance, neither our own, 
nor those of other men, nor do we perceive God, and hence 
the technical term "Idea* cannot be properly used in refer­
ence to our knowledge of spirits, Berkeley does at times 
say we have an idea of spirit but only in the sense that we 
know it.
fhe tern •'notion" is used to designate our knowledge 
of spirits "In a large sense indeed we may be said to have 
an idea or rather a notion of spirit, that is, we understand 
the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or
1 ~
Prine., Part 1, par. 2, (II, 41f.)
2
Vol. II, p. 13.
26
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deny any thing of it.*1 He desires a different word to indi- 
cate our knowledge of a radically different entity, Possibly 
he does not develop his notion of *notionH because it is only 
a word, and he is professedly disinterested in mere verbal 
issues. We have knowledge of spiritual substancej the tech­
nical tern MideaH cannot be applied to this knowledge, but 
what It is called is of no great concern. Perhaps this is the 
way Berkeley would look at the issue. It may well be, however, 
that he was unable to give an adequate explanation of *notionn,
and that this is the true reason for his brevity and vagueness
4
with regard to this word.
We might wonder if the notion we have of spiritual sub­
stance is not actually an abstract idea, The fact that we can 
*affirm or deny any thing of it,* does not prove we have any 
understanding of it, for we can do this even with material sub­
stance, Is Berkeley’s treatment of wnotionw condemned to b© 
vague and nebulous because ho wants to posit knowledge of an 
entity which, v/ithin his own philosophical world, should remain 
unknowable? We shall try to keep this question in mind as we 
consider more fully Berkeley * s treatment of spiritual substance.
5  ^  ^ ^
Prlnc. Part 1, par. 140, (II, 105).
4
Warnock, p. 205, thinks that Berkeley’s explanation 
of notion was quite unsatisfactory. Likewise U, Baladi, La 
pensee religieuae de Berkeley et 1*unite de sa philosophie.
XS'arls, Vrin, 1§45T~P. iol' *Par notion, iT^ne faut entrend re 
autre chose qu’une certain© connaissance— Bn principe, tout 
ee dont nous avons une notion, nous la connaissons.”
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Y/hile it appears that Berkeley does not have any pre­
decessor in the use of •‘notion* as a technical term, at least 
in the meaning which he gives it, yet a certain similarity 
with the “intuition* of Descartes can he detected. For 
Descartes, an intuition was a clear and distinct knowledge hy 
which we could see with certitude such things as our own ex­
istence, that a triangle has three sides, that the glohe has a 
single surface and so on,^ She parallel is not exact for the 
intuition of Descartes is not restricted to the knowledge of 
spirits hut the manner of knowing hears a marked resemblance* 
The “inner feeling* of Malebranche is likewise similar to 
Berkeley*s “notion*, although Berkeley knows only himself by an 
immediate non-demonstrative type of knowledge, whereas Male­
branche also knows God in this way.
It seems then that “intuition* and “inner feeling* 
would be satisfactory descriptions of our knowledge of self as 
a spirit as Berkeley explains it. However, “notion* applies 
not only to our knowledge of self, but also to our knowledge 
of other spirits and of God. Here, as we shall see, the manner 
of our knowledge is not the same as in our knowledge of self.
In this way Berkeley’s term “notion* has a wider scope than 
either the “intuition* of Descartes or the “inner feeling* of 
Malebranche.
In the Principles of Human knowledge. Berkeley tries
to prove the existence of an incorporeal active substance or 
   — ■—       —
Descartes, Regulae ad Dlrectlonera Ingenli. Reg. Ill, 
(Vol. X, p. 368).
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spirit.** We perceive a continual succession of ideas which 
must depend on some cause to produce them. This cause can­
not be any quality, or idea, or combination of ideas. Clearly 
an ideam which is purely passive, cannot cause anything. Just 
look at the ideas in your mind and you will find in them no 
power or activity. Their being is to be perceived; they are 
essentially, indeed entirely, passive. Hence an idea or a 
combination of them cannot be the cause of the successive 
ideas we perceive.
The cause of our ideas must therefore be a substance. 
But it has been established already that there is no corpo­
real active substance. Consequently there must be an incor­
poreal active substance which is the cause of our ideas.
Such is Berkeley’s general argument for the exist­
ence of spiritual substance. In terms of his own philosophy 
he has argued cogently against ideas as causes. But the pure 
passivity of ideas or sensible things is gratuitous and rests 
on the esse eat percipi principle which Berkeley has failed 
to establish conclusively. Moreover such a position is hard­
ly in line with common sense or the generality of men— al­
though in itself this is only an indication, not a proof, of 
its falsity. If we acknowledge his definition of idea, then 
of course the argument is very solid.
However the claim that the cause of our ideas must be 
a substance, involves a jump which requires further consider-
 g--------------------------------------------------------------
Brine.. Part I, par. 26, (II, 52).
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atlon. It seems to imply that things are either ideas or 
substances and that this is a complete disjunction. But to 
presuppose these two categories as exhaustive would be 
begging the question. Berkeley is, in effect, assuming the 
existence of that which he professes to prove.
Moreover the very term substance may be an abstract
idea since we do not perceive substances. We perceive sen-
7sible things, and, as Hume asserts,'the same difficulties 
with regard to material substance also apply to spiritual 
substance along with additional ones peculiar to it. But 
Hume * s arguments prove that we cannot have an idea of spirit 
since to have an idea we must have a sensation. As we have 
seen, Berkeley does not claim that v/e have an idea of spirit, 
so that Hume’s criticism is not entirely germane, and does 
not prove we do not know spiritual substance.
Both Hume and Berkeley accept the Lockean position 
that we know our own sensations, and their disagreement seems 
to revolve on the Issue of whether we can argue back from our 
sensations to a spiritual substance presupposed by the exist-
 tf     ;     -
Bavid Hume, A treatise on Human, ifature, (Oxford, 
Glare don, 1889) editetf \sj 1." A'.' ^ elby-Bl'ggelie. I, part IT, 
sec. 5, (p. 232f,}. ”$his question [the meaning of substance] 
we have found Impossible to be answer’d with regard to matter 
and body: But besides that in the case of the .mind, it la­
bours under all the same difficulties, ’tis burthen*d with 
some additional ones, which are peculiar to that subject. As 
every idea is deriv’d from a precedent impression, had we 
any idea of the substance of our minds, we must also have an 
Impression of it; which is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to be conceived. For how can an impression represent a sub­
stance, otherwise than by resembling It? And how can an im­
pression resemble a substance, since, according to this phi­
losophy, it is not a substance, and has none of the peculiar 
qualities or characteristics of a substance?”
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enee of these sensations, Hume denies the efficacy of rea­
son to do s o f o r  this would involve a causal argument end­
ing with the existence of spiritual substance, Berkeley has 
merely assumed the causal principle which Hume attacked and 
in no way has foreseen the objections Hume presented. Al­
though Berkeley is more confident in the power of reason, he 
has not sought to justify this confidence.
In treating spiritual substance, Berkeley divides 
his consideration into three parts: self, other finite spirits, 
and God, The existence of each of these three is not known in 
the same way, Ve have looked at Berkeley*s general argument 
which does not distinguish between God and finite spirits (al­
though strictly speaking Berkeley should have presented it 
only as an argument for the existence of Goc$« But let us now 
treat each separately. How do we know, first of all, of our 
own existence as a spiritual being?
**We comprehend our own being by inward feeling or re- 
9
flection.* And a clearer statement, **I do nevertheless know 
that I who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as cer­
tainly as I know my ideas exist, Farther I know what I mean 
by the terms I and myself; and I know this immediately and in­
tuitively, though I do not perceive it, as I perceive a triangle,
§
Ibid. Sk. I, Part III, sec. 6, (p. 86) "*Tis there­
fore by SfflililSHGB only, that we can infer the existence of 
one object from that of another.** Tide etiam sec, 2-5 for 
Hume*s views on causality.
9
Princ., Part L, par. 89, (II, 80),
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a colour or a sound. Berkeley knows himself intuitively 
to he a spiritual substance; he appears to have no hesi­
tation or difficulty on this point. But we can easily ob­
ject that we do not have such an intuition. Did not Berke­
ley himself make a similar objection with regard to abstract 
ideas? Berkeley does not seem to have any other refuge than 
to reaffirm his position, since he has made an assertion for 
which he has no arguments.
We perceive a succession of ideas. But how do we 
know that our inward being is any more than this succession?
If all our knowledge begins with our senses, how is this in­
tuition of self as a spiritual being to be explained? It 
does not seem consonant with Berkeley*s epistemology. He 
also mentions reflection as a means of knowing self as a spir­
itual substance, but no specific argument is developed to sup­
port this contention. The general argument we have consid­
ered above does not apply because it would mean that we are 
the cause of our own ideas. But as we shall see when we treat 
of God*s existence, Berkeley rejects self as an adequate expla­
nation of the continual succession of ideas which we perceive. 
In view then of his theory of knowledge, it appears that Berke­
ley has no justification for saying that self is any more than 
a flux of perceptions. To posit self as a spiritual substance
--------- is--------------------------------------------------------------
Mai. II, 231.
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is gratuitous.
In proving the existence of God, Berkeley argues 
from the mind-dependent nature of sensible things, MSensible 
things do really exists and if they really exist, they are 
necessarily perceived by an infinite minds therefore there 
is an infinite mind or God. This furnishes you with a direct 
and immediate demonstration from a most evident principle; of 
the being of God.**-^  Berkeley's argument clearly hangs on the 
validity of the esse est pcrcipi principle. Unless the exist­
ence of sensible things consists in being perceived, the proof 
collapses. It is to be noted that the proof as presented here 
is rather elliptical. The necessity of sensible things being 
perceived by an infinite mind is not evident because Berkeley 
has omitted the step which would refer to the inadequacy of 
appealing to the perception of finite percelvers to account 
for the existence of sensible things.
 n — ■— ■— ■— — ---- *—  -------— - ------ -— ■
0. H, Morris, Locke. Berkeley. Hume. (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1946), p. 100, also points" out that Berkeley 
gives no adequate justification of the immediate knowledge he 
claims the mind has of itself. Laky, p. S3 writes: "It must 
immediately be pointed out that he fails to give a rational 
explanation of his knowledge of, and belief in, the existence 
of his own mind, as a spiritual substance**. The objection of 
Laky that if spiritual substance has no percipi, it has no esse 
or reality seems unsatisfactory since Berkeley refers the esse 
est percipi only to sensible things. Luce p. 146-148, defends 
Serkeley's intuitive knowledge of self but merely gives Berke­
ley's own view without answering any objections, or offering 
any new arguments to support this position.
12
Mai., II, 212.
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Although Berkeley uses the esse est percipi to
prove the existence of Sod, he conversely requires the
existence of God to maintain the reality of sensible things.
In terms of his thought if God were not perceiving things
then they would only exist when some finite perceiver is
actually perceiving them* In the latter case there would he
13no "external* world, no sensible things which are independ­
ent of the mind even in the sense which Berkeley allows.
There is then a circularity in Berkeley's argument since he 
has proven the existence of God from the reality of sensible 
things whose existence consists in being perceived. Tet he 
also needs the existence of God before he can assert the
1 Areality of sensible things.
Berkeley presents another argument for the existence 
of God. Beginning with the succession of ideas we have, he 
argues to God as their cause. These ideas which we have are 
vivid, orderly, coherent and are not caused by ourselves. They 
are external to us, and not subject to our control;
----------------- j j ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vide infra, p. 35 for Berkeley's meaning of "exter­
nal*,.
14
J. Collins, p. 393, notes this circularity "The cap­
ital distinction between what is strictly perceivable and what 
is only Imaginable by us, is secured only by measuring the 
humanly perceivable by the implicit standard of what God actu­
ally perceives. But this means that the Hew Principle i t self’ 
esse est percipi , both serves as the basis for the proof of 
God *s existence and stands in need of His existence for its 
own foundation,"
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The things perceived by sense may be termed external, with 
regard to their origin, in that they are not generated from 
within, by the mind itself, but imprinted by a spirit dis­
tinct from that which perceives them* Sensible objects may 
likewise be said to be without the mind, in another sense, 
namely when they exist in some other mind. Thus when I shut 
my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in 
another mind.5
Berkeley, the friend of common sense, does not claim to con­
trol the idea of sense which he has in his mind. They are 
independent of his mind and hence require some active being 
as their efficient cause. The sensible things themselves can­
not be the cause since they are purely passive. Only an infi­
nite mind or God have caused this marvellous harmony of ideas 
which we experience.
This argument is basically the same as the previous 
one. In the former, we begin with sensible things, in the 
latter with the ideas in the mind, but both are identical. 
Likewise the esse est percipi principle Is invoked in each 
argument, finally God is the cause who accounts for the real­
ity of sensible things or the vividness and order of the ideas.
We might also note that God is the immediate cause of 
all things. *One idea not the cause of another, one power not 
the cause of another. The cause of all natural things is
•j c
only God. Hence trifling to enquire after second Causes.# 
Because he holds for the pure passivity of sensible things, 
Berkeley is forced to take this radical position.
--------- 15----------------------------------------------------------
Princ.. Part I, par. 90, (II, 80).
16
P. 0., par. 443, (I, 54).
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Descartes had argued to the existence of sensible
things or the corporeal word on the basis that a position
such as that which Berkeley has embraced would make God a 
17deceiver* We have the impression, Descartes argues, that
sensible things are causes e.g. fire causes pain. We have
no means of knowing that this pain is caused directly by 
God rather than by the fire itself and in fact are inclined 
to believe it is the fire which is the cause.
Although Berkeley does not give an explicit answer 
to Descartes on this point, it is easy to provide the answer 
he might have made, Descartes is deceived when he thinks 
that corporeal objects act on us, or are in any way causes, 
but the deception is not the fault of God. What Descartes 
has failed to realize is the pure passivity of ideas. Once 
we recognize the true nature of ideas, then it is evident 
that God caused all things, and hence the delusion to which
we are inclined can be avoided.
Mfhe connexion of ideas does not imply the relation 
of cause and effect but only of a mark or sign with the 
thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of
--------- IT---------------------------------------------------------
Descartes, Mediattones de prima philosophla. 
Meditation VI, (Vol. Vtll, pT y§f) , "Cum Deus" non sl't' fallax, 
oranino manifestum est ilium nec per se iimediate istas ideas 
mihi imnittere, nec etiaza mediants aliqua ereatura, in qua 
earum realitas objectiva, non formal!ter, sed eminenter 
tanturn contineatur. Cum enim nullam plane faeultatem mihi 
dederit ad hoc agnoseendura, sed contra magnam propensionum 
ad credendum illas a rebus corporeis eraitti, non video qua 
ratione posset intellegi ipsum non esse fallacem, si aliunde 
quara a rebus corporeis emitterentur. Ac proinde res corporeae 
existunt
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the pain I suffer upon my approaching it but the mark that
T8
forewarns me of it.* But if there is no causal relation- 
ship among sensible things or ideas then it seems we could 
not come to know causality. Hot by an idea for it is not 
a sensible thing ana not by a notion unless some intuition 
of it is to be claimed. Moreover, in the Philosophical 
Commentaries, Berkeley writes, "Fihil dat quod non habet or 
the effect is contained in the cause is an axiom I do not 
understand or believe to be true.*-*-9 Here he takes the posi­
tion with regard to causality which is more in harmony with 
ids thought. Yet his argument for the existence of Cod in­
volves causality. It proceeds on the assumption that the 
sensible things we perceive must have a cause. However to 
reject secondary causality seems to involve the rejection of, 
or at least a skeptical position with regard to, all causal­
ity. It seems to lead to a doctrine like Hume’s.
 m      ---------------------
Brine., Bart I, par. 65, (II, 69). A. J. Ayer, 
p. 225t shows the influence of Berkeley on his own understand­
ing of cause. “How it is quite? time that what Berkeley meant 
by “power or activity* is not anywhere to be detected in the 
objects that we perceive; but the inference I draw from this 
is not that such objects cannot have causal properties, but 
rather the term “cause* must, in the context, be divorced from 
the animistic notions of power and activity if it is to have 
any significant application and indeed, in the sense in which 
I am interpreting “causality", Berkeley himself areed that 
"ideas* could cause one another for he regarded the "laws of 
nature* as de facto correlations of "ideas*, A. A. Luce, p.91, 
gives a helpTul summary of Berkeley’s view on causality.
19
P. C., par. 780, (I, 94).
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At first sight Berkeley’s proof for the existence of 
God looks more like those of St, Thomas Aquinas than like 
the ontological proof of Descartes. Bar Berkeley proceeds 
from sensible things rather than from the idea of God in the 
mind. But since these sensible things do not have an abso­
lute “external® existence in as much as their esse is percipi.
Berkeley is beginning like Descartes, and unlike Aquinas, in
20
the mind. The order is similar to that of Descartes, 
commencing with the thinking thing and its ideas and proceed­
ing to God, although Berkeley does not go on to prove the 
existence of the extramental world.
Berkeley argues from ideas to God as their cause. But 
the ideas are the real things, that is, the real and the ideal 
are identical and the argument should end with God as an idea. 
However Berkeley does not accept this conclusion. He desires 
to go beyond the limits which his own thought allows. Thus 
he attempts to give a cosmological argument but starting as 
he does from within his own mind, such an essay is doomed to 
fail.
~
Descartes, Meditationes. In Hed. Ill, (Vol. VII, 
p. 34-52) the existence of Soil is proved" by considering the 
idea of God, as eternal, infinite, all powerful etc* and 
arguing from this idea to God as the cause of this idea. In 
Med. V* (Vol. VII, p. 63—71) he argues from the impossibility 
ofconceiving God except as existing to the fact that he exists. 
In both cases Descartes begins in the mind with an idea and in 
fact, both arguments are basically the same. Only after esta­
blishing God’s existence does he attempt to prove the exist­
ence of the world in Med. VI, (Vol. VII, p. 71-80).
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How does Berkeley deal with other spirits besides 
ourselves and Grad? Jirst, we might point out that he makes 
no explicit mention of angels, although much of his treat­
ment of finite spirits could apply equally well to angels 
and men. Moreover we should remember that in the Cartesian 
tradition, the distinction between men and angels narrows; 
their mode of knowledge particularly is more alike than in 
Thomistic thought.
We cannot know the existence of other spirits, 
otherwise than by their operations or the ideas of them 
excited in us, I perceive notions, changes, and combina­
tions of ideas, that infora me there are certain particu­
lar agents like my self, which accompany them, and concur 
in their production. Hence the knowledge I have of other 
spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; 
but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred 
to agents or spirits distinct from rayself, as effects or 
concomitant signs
This argument clearly presupposes the questionable state­
ments which Berkeley used to establish •’myself* as a spirit­
ual substance. Moreover he appeals to a causal principle 
when he uses the words ”effects or concomitant signs’*. He 
appears to use ’effects” and M cone omit ant signs” synonymous­
ly in the quotation, but clearly the words have different 
meanings. ”Effects” imply causality; ”concomitant signs” 
do not. If intermediary ideas are effects then spirits can
--------- 51------------------------------ — ------------ - ------------
Brine., Bart I, par, 145* (II* 107), Berkeley 
does not give any examples of the ideas excited in us by 
which we come to know the existence of other spirits. 
Probably he means the talking, walking, eating, etc,, which 
we observe other men doing.
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be argued to as their cause, although we might question 
Berkeley*s consistency in doing so* He would he holding 
both that God is the only cause and that there are second­
ary spiritual beings, other human minds, which are also
causes, If he means that these ideas are merely concomi­
tant signs by which we know spirits —  how is this possi­
ble? In this case there is no reason to posit the exist­
ence of finite spirits at all, sinoe everything can he ex­
plained directly by the first cause, God. Ihe argument for 
the existence of other finite spirits does not stand up 
under close scrutiny.
Berkeley does admit that, Hwe do not see a man if 
by man is meant that which moves, perceives and thinks as 
we do; but only such a certain collection of i d e a s .”22 How 
can we know that man is any more than this combination of 
Ideas or sensations which are caused by God and which 
really exist only in God? What further explanation than 
this is required by Berkeley’s thought?
In this third dialogue between Hylas and Philonous,
23
Berkeley pursues this issue further. His spokesman Phil­
onous points out that the existence of other finite spirits
------- 55---------- - ----------- --------- ------- - ----
Brine.. Bart I, par. 148, (II, 109).
23
Mai.. II, 233f. J. P. deG. Bay, p. 96f., thinks 
that Berkeley anticipates the objection of Huae that we know 
ourselves only as a bundle of perceptions and satisfactorily 
answers it.
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is know neither by an immediate evidence nor by a demonstra­
tive knowledge. Nevertheless such spirits are not to be put 
on an equal footing with matter because there is no repugnancy 
in a spirit being the subject of ideas. The exposition ends, 
•*1 have a notion of spirit, though X have not strictly speak­
ing, an idea of it. I do not perceive it as an idea or by 
means of an idea, but know it by reflexion.”
Berkeley admits that we do not have "immediate evi­
dence” of other finite spirits. This means we do not per­
ceive them as we do sensible things or ideas, nor do we have 
an intuitive knowledge of them as we do of ourselves as spir­
itual beings. Likewise we are unable to demonstrate the ex­
istence of other finite spirits. Unless Berkeley is not being 
entirely consistent, and this is a distinct possibility, he 
must mean some particular type of proof by the phrase "demon­
strative knowledge”. However, since he does not elucidate 
his meaning, it is impossible to ascertain the exact signifi­
cation of this phrase. The knowledge by "reflexion” seeras to 
refer to the proof which argues from ideas as effects back to 
their cause, in this instance, other finite spirits. Would 
this not mean that we know spirits by means of ideas? Yet 
Berkeley took the contrary opinion in the question above, MI 
have not strictly speaking an idea of it fspirit]", Perhaps 
he means that even though it is from ideas that we come to 
know spirits, the actual knowledge itself is not an idea.
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Thus far in the Dialogue Berkeley has only argued 
that the existence of other finite spirits does not involve 
a contradiction and he refers to this existence as Ma proba­
bility*1, Hylas now objects that there is no need in 
Philonous * philosophy to posit any type of substance but Ba 
system of floating ideas** will suffice* Philonous replies 
that he himself is a thinking active principle that knows 
ideas and he knows what he means when he affirms that spirit­
ual substance supports ideas. This is the whole answer given; 
it does not seem entirely germane to the objection* The 
existence of self as a spiritual substance which does not 
involve a contradiction has been asserted. But no satisfac-
24
Dial*. II, 233*. *HYMS. Notwithstanding all you 
have said, to me it seems that according to your way of think­
ing, and in consequence of your own principles, it should 
follow that you are only a system of floating ideas, without 
any substance to support them. Words are not to be used with­
out a meaning* And as there is no more meaning in spiritual 
substance than in material substance, the one is to be ex­
ploded as well as the other.
PHILONOUS. How often must I repeat, that I know or am con­
scious of my own being; and that I my self am not my ideas, 
but somewhat else; a thinking active principle that perceives, 
knows, wills; and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and 
the same self, perceive both colours and sounds; that a colour 
cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour; that 1 am there­
fore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; 
and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and
inert ideas. But I am not in like manner conscious either of
the existence or essence of matter. On the contrary, I know 
that nothing inconsistent can exist; and that the existence 
of matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I 
mean, when I affirm there is a spiritual substance or support 
of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas.
But I do not know what is meant, when it is said, that an im-
perceiving substance hath inherent in It and supports either
Ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the 
whole no parity of case between spirit and matter.
HYLAS. I own my self satisfied in this point.**
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tory proof* of other finite spirits has actually been given.
The existence of God, the infinite percelver, sufficiently 
explains the existence of sensible things, leaving the exist­
ence of other finite spirits superflous.
Berkeley makes the claim in his dialogue with which 
we have been dealing, that he understands what he means when 
he says a spiritual substance supports ideas. We should re­
call that this very point had been made against material sub­
stance. The opponent, Hylas, had been unable to explain what 
he meant by matter supporting its accidents. Since he could 
not do so, this was taken as an argument against the existence 
of matter. Tet Philonous here asserts that he knows the mean­
ing of spiritual substance supporting ideas. Conveniently 
however, he is not challenged to explain his meaning and he 
does not volunteer the information.
This line of thought leads up to some very significant
inquiries. How do sensible tilings exist in the minds of finite
spirits? Moreover, if sensible things are independent of fi-
note perceivers with regard to their existence, what is the
difference between their existence in finite perceivers and in
God? Indeed, how can ideas which are purely passive be in God
at all since he is pure act? Berkeley does not say that ideas
25
are not in God, but he fails to explain his position suffi-
S  ' ' '
Dial,, II, 213f. MI do not understand how our Ideas, 
which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the 
essence, or any part Tor like any part) of the essence or sub­
stance of God, who is an Impassive, indivisible, purely active 
being.*
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eiently. God causes the things we perceive to exist hut 
since their very existence consists in being perceived, 
then how can we say they are not part of God? In other 
words, his esse est percipi principle seems to involve an 
implicit pantheism which the Anglican Bishop would certain- 
ly reject.^ In fact, he seems completely unaware of any
such taint In his thought.
Berkeley does at least distinguish the way things 
are perceived by raen and the \my they are perceived by God.
We are affected by impressions of sense, and gain our know­
ledge through sensation. But this is an imperfection, and
God, Who is pure spirit, cannot be subject to any imperfec- 
27tions. God knows all things but not through sensation.
 ----gg-------------- - ------ ----
G. Arnold, p. 119 f., also points out that pantheism 
seems to be the logical result of Berkeley’s system. Luce, 
p. 22, writes: * Berkeley was a theist, loyal to his creed, 
and pantheism was not in him. He believed in the world of 
sense which is other than God? he believed in the society 
of finite spirits, which is other than God* cf. Ibid., p. 73. 
There is no doubt that Berkeley was not a pantheist, but what 
Luce, as ’well as Berkeley, fail to show is how he can logi­
cally and consistently avoid a pantheistic position.
27
Dial.. II, 240f. "PHILONOUS, That God knows or 
understands" all things, but that he knows among other things 
what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what 
it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question.
But that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful 
sensations in us, can Him self suffer pain, I positively deny. 
\4& who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impres­
sions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which being 
produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. 
But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives 
nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and inde­
pendent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or 
resisted by nothing; it Is evident, such a being as this can
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We still hare not been told how the ideas exist either in us 
or in God. Moreover unless the Divine Ideas are identical 
with the Mvine Essence, then God would be imperfect, since 
any real distinction would imply composition of parts. It 
seems then that Berkeley should logically equate the Mvine 
Ideas with the real existence of sensible things. But since 
this pantheistic position conflicts with his Christian theism, 
we cannot expect a satisfactory explanation of how things 
exist in God.
Without discussing at this point the various facul­
ties of the raind, let us consider at great length the meaning 
of mind or spirit for Berkeley. *4 spirit is one simple undi­
vided active being.”28 fhe key word in the above description 
active. This characteristic of activity sets spirit in 
direct contrast to ideas or sensible things whose passivity 
has been so vehemently stressed.
However, on the distinction between the mind and its 
ideas, Berkeley does not maintain a consistent opinion. In 
the Philosophical Commentaries he indites, rtfhe very exist-
suffer nothing, nor he affected with any painful sensation 
or indeed any sensation at all....To know everything is 
certainly a perfection; but to enture, to suffer, or fool any 
thing by sense, is an imperfection, The former, I say, agrees 
to Sod, but not the latter. God knows or hath ideas; but His 
ideas are not convey’d to Him by sense, as ours are.M
28
Princ., Part I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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©nee of Ideas constitutes the soul* and again in this same 
work, “Take away Perceptions & you take away the Mind* and 
even more forcefully, “Say you the Mind is not the Percep­
tion’s hut that thing which perceives. I answer you are
abus’d by the words that & thing these are vague empty words
20without a meaning.* J The mind is identified with its ideas,
30in a position which sounds very much like that of Hume.
But since ideas are passive, and the mind active, how can 
the mind be a mass of ideas any more than it can be one idea?
In the third mid final dialogue between Hylas and 
Philonous, Berkeley’s spokesman gives this reverse view, *1 
my self am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking active 
principle that perceives, knows, wills and operates about 
ideas.* 31 Here we have a complete volte-face. The two
--------- 23-------------------------------------------------------------
P.O., par. 580, 581, (I, 72). Although we cannot 
always take positions out of the P.O. and attribute them to 
Berkeley, yet it Is clear here that he endorses this position, 
and moreover, It does fit in with his thought at least as 
well as the contrary position that ideas are distinct from 
the spirit in which they reside,
30
Hume, A Treatise on Hum. Bnd., Bk. I, Part 17, sec. 
6, (p. 253). The mind is *nothing but a bundle or collection 
of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an 
inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and move­
ment. ...There are the successive perceptions only, that con­
stitute the mind.* Hume seems to mean that the self is 
always changing, so that there Is really no personal identity. 
Berkeley uses the word “congeriesM, (P.O. par, 580), which 
stresses the combination of all our perceptions rather than 
their mutability.
31
Dial., II, 233. The first edition was published in 
1713. The* philosophical Goipiaentari.es were written in 1707-8 
although published onlyposthumously.
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positions are quite clearly opposed and cannot be harmon— 
i zed.
But this later position involves a difficulty which. 
Berkeley himself pointed out in the third text from the 
Philosophical Commentaries quoted above* wThat thing which 
perceives" is an abstraction, "vague empty words." If the 
being of the mind consists in perceiving, which is an activ­
ity, then how could Berkeley speak of it as a substance?
32That which acts should be distinguished from its activity,
33although there is no such distinction in Descartes, who 
may have influenced Berkeley on this point. But if the per­
ceiving thing or thinking thing is identified with the sub­
stance, then other activities should be excluded. To say 
that activities such as imagining, willing etc., are merely 
forms of thought is arbitrary and dodges the problem. Berke­
ley Is caught either way; if he abstracts the substance from 
its activity he is violating one of his own tenets; if he 
Identifies the substance with its perception he cannot explain 
the various activities observable in man.
 ^   ------------------------------
Warnock, p. 205f., criticizes Berkeley on this same 
point "Surely to speak of something as a substance is to claim 
that it can somehow be distinguished from what it does."
33
Descartes, Meditations, Med. II, (Vol. VII, p. 28), 
**Sed quid igitur sum? lies dogiians, Quid eat hoc? Nempe 
dubitans, intelligens, affirmans, negans, volens, nolens, 
i magi nans quoque, Sc senileas," Of. Prineipia Philosophise.
I, 62, (Vol. VIII, p. 30).
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If we return to the description of mind as the 
"congeries of Ideas**, we can discover another obstacle.
Unity and simplicity would be lacking. And following from 
this, immortality, which is of great importance to Berkeley. 
He is most emphatic in his affirmations on the continued 
existence of the soul after death. For if the mind is 
merely the gathered mass of ideas then there is patently no 
real unity. Without unity the soul is divisible, composed 
of parts and hence there would be no immortality by nature. 
Moreover, if the mind is merely a bundle of perceptions, 
then each mind would be essentially different; there would 
be no human nature. Such a position contradicts very strik­
ingly the tenor of Berkeley’s thought. On this count there­
fore and also because of the meaning of idea for Berkeley, 
it seems necessary for the Bishop of Oloyne to reject this 
earlier position. But the later position which distinguishes 
the perceiver from his ideas does not, as we have seen, fit 
his thought either, clashing as It does with his stand on 
abstract ideas.
In the Principles of Human Knowledge, Berkeley says 
that spirit does signify a "real thing", but once again he 
merely refers to it as "that which perceives ideas.**  ^ It
53 '
Vide, P. C. par, 814. (I. 97); Brine.. Part I.
par. 141, (II, 105f); Ale., VI, 112, (IIl7 W ) ;  Sermons I
and VIII, (VII, 9-15; W-113).
Prine., Part I, par. 139, (II, 104). This work was 
first published in 1710.
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seems that Berkeley was unable to solve the problem himself; 
he could not give a clear and consistent meaning to spirit­
ual substance but was unwilling to discard this notion. His 
failure was due not to any lack of intellectual acumen, but 
rather to his doctrine on abstract ideas which should logi­
cally exclude all substance whether spiritual or material as 
an empty, unknowable abstraction.
If we recall Berkeley’s general proof for the exist- 
ence of spiritual substance which was presented above, we 
shall note that it implies a distinction between spirit and 
the ideas which inhere in it. For in this argument, spirit 
is presented as an active being which causes ideas. Such a 
being is manifestly distinct from the Ideas it causes and its 
existence consists in perceiving. "The existence of Active 
things is to act, of inactive to be perceived.1*^
Perhaps if we pursue this basic distinction between 
the existence of spirits and that of ideas, it will help us 
to penetrate deeper into Berkeley’s understanding of spirit. 
First of all, we might point out that, in M s  phenomenolog­
ical approach to philosophy, Berkeley is not aiming at a phi­
losophy of being. He is not concerned with the existence of 
things as such, "the Schools coined the word Existence sup­
posed to stand for an abstract general Idea." To say merely
 ^            ---------
Vide supra, p. 28f.
57
P.O., par. 673, (I, 82).
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that a thing exists is meaningless for Berkeley; existence 
as a predicate tells us nothing, fhe term ^existence* as
■5C0
applied to active and passive things is, moreover equivocal.
For *to act” and *to he perceived* are distinct and to some 
extent contraries, since being perceived is one way of being 
acted upon. Even though existence is always considered in 
terms of perception, whether perceiving or being perceived, 
the equivocation does not seem to be avoided, although it is 
perhaps not as readily noticed.
It would seem more appropriate to say that the 
essence of active things is to act, since Berkeley is inter­
ested, not in the act of existing but in what things are. 
Berkeley, however, is not much concerned with a distinction 
between the essence and the act of existing. His treatment 
of existence does tend to treat existence itself as an essence. 
However, to say that he is dealing with the essence rather than 
the existence of active things would be an oversimplification. 
His philosophy does not seem to lend itself to a transposition 
into the language of essence and esse.
If the existence of spirits is to act, how are God and 
man to be distinguished in this respect? Berkeley does say that
Of. G* Lascaris, ’Gonsecuentias de las reduce!on del 
ser del yo, eonsistente en percibira ser percibido”, Revista 
Rilosofia. 13 (Juil. 1954). Lascaris notes this equivocation on 
page"' “Has encontramos, pues, en Berkeley, con dos formulas 
compleraentarias: eese=percipi, esse = percipere. Con dos
*clases8, de existencia: la ae las" ideas (= ser percibidas), y 
la de las sustancias espirituales (= percibir). Ehtre ambas 
clases de existencia hay heterogeneidad complete, al ser el 
esse termino equfvoco."
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the scholastic teaching on analogy is a ttgood notion* and
defends it in relation to our knowledge of God.-^ in this
case our activity could he considered limited and finite
whereas the activity of God is infinite, or God is said to
he actus purus. Berkeley also speaks of God as the only
being whose existence is necessary, while the existence of
men is only contingent*
However, Berkeley also said that there were no degrees
of existence. In his fourth letter to Samuel Johnson, the
40
American philosopher, he states that to speak of existing 
r^aore* makes no sense; such talk is the result of an abstract 
idea of existence. Bit since existence follows from being 
perceived and something is either perceived or It is not per­
ceived, then there is no room for degrees of existence. Here 
Berkeley seems to be thinking along the lines that a thing 
either exists or it does not exist. This is an employment in 
the order of metaphysics of the principle of demonstration, 
which is a logical principle. In logic this is certainly a 
basic principle and its validity is manifest. Bit to use it 
as a metaphysical principle is disastrous. This means that 
you would say of a particular existing thing, that either it 
exists or it does not exist. This is not in aecord with one 
who purportedly accepts the evidence of the senses. It should
' J9  ^  ^ ^
Ale.. V, 17, IS, (III, 163-165).
40
Vol. II, p. 293.
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be clear that the particular existing thing does exist. 
Otherwise you will be tending toward an idealist position.
The example used by the Bishop of Cloyne refers to the exist­
ence of sensible things but there is no indication that the 
position of no degrees of existence is to be thus restricted. 
Would he not also agree that a spiritual being either per­
ceives or it does not perceive and that there is similarly 
no place for degrees of existence in this case?
The notion of analogy^ as applied to active beings 
would certainly clash with this position, since if there are 
no degrees of being, then being is univocal. There can be 
analogy without degrees as when we speak of being as it is 
realised in two men, but when analogy is used in reward to 
God and man, there must be degrees of existence admitted. A
univocal understanding of being is in line with the Cartesian 
42tradition, whereas the doctrine of analogy does not fit 
very well into Berkeley’s thought, jarring particularly with 
his rejection of abstract ideas. Bor if we used words such 
as existence in an analogous sense, we would have to prescind
-H ----------------------------------------------------
Baladi explains Berkeley’s use of analogy, p. 140. 
"Berkeley distingue entre une perfection prise formellement 
et en elle-meme, et le mode d’etre ou d’exercise de cette 
perfection. ^Et bien qu’il y ait une distance infinie entre 
les modes d'etre divin et humain, la perfection, formellement 
parlant,^est la raeme; mais paroe qu’elle comports en fait des 
modes d’etre essentiellement differents, elle est dit plutot 
analogue qu’identique.”
42
Descartes does not say explicitly that being is 
univocal. However, his whole philosophy seems to imply this 
position.
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from their concrete realization in particular things. But 
if Being is taken as univocal, Berkeley cannot distinguish 
God and finite spirits on the level of being.
If, on the other hand, there are degrees of existence 
among spiritual beings, although not among sensible things, 
what follows? Jirst of all, existence Is an equivocal term 
which means ttto act” or Hto be perceived”, When it means 
"to act” it is used analogically and admits of degrees* When 
it is used to mean Mto be perceived” it is univocal, not ad­
mitting of more or less, fhis is hardly a plausible position, 
Yet the equivocal meaning of existence is clear as also its 
univocal application In regard to sensible things, fhe only 
point which Berkeley does not clarify is the use of existence 
as predicated of active beings, 'Whether existence is said to 
be univocal or analogical in such cases, many questions have 
been left unanswered.
In the next chapter we shall turn to some of the 
activities of spiritual beings. This procedure will assist 
us in elucidating the differences between God and man, between 
the Infinite and the finite. The meaning of spirit itself 
should come clearer.
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THE ACTIVITIES OF SPIRITUAL SUBSTA2TCES
Berkeley speaks of various activities of the mind, 
although he does not deal with them systematically. In his 
writings sensing, imagining, thinking and willing could he 
distinguished, and they would correspond to the senses, 
imagination, understanding and will, respectively. Each of 
these shall he treated to see if they represent faculties 
or powers distinct from a spiritual substance in thich they 
reside.
"Thoughts do most properly signify or are mostly 
taken for the interior operations of the mind, wherein the 
mind is active, those that obey not the acts of volition, & 
in which the mind is passive are more properly call’d sensa­
tion or perceptions."1 Sensation then as distinguished from 
thought is passive, and hence cannot he really called an op­
eration or activity of the mind. We might also note that 
perception and sensation are used synonymously. While "there 
is somewhat active in most perceptions i.e. such as ensue 
upon our volitions, such as we can prevent & stop v.g* I turn
p
my eyes toward the sun I open them all this is active",
1 ~  
P.O., par. 286, (I, 35).
2
P.O., par. 67a, (I, 82).
54
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clearly the activity itself is not part of the sensation. In
the example given, the seeing of the sun, we can turn towards
or away from it hut the actual seeing, the sensation involved,
is passive. We do not control what we see when our eyes are
directed towards a particular object and this holds true
mutatls mutandis for all the external senses.
In the first Dialogue, Berkeley develops his reasons
for considering perception or sensation to he passives
PHILONOUS. But doth it... depend on your will, that in 
looking on this flower, you perceived white rather than 
any other colour? On directing your open eyes toward 
yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or 
is light or darkness the effect of your volition?
HYLAS. No certainly.
PHXIiQNQUS. You are then in these respects altogether passive. 
HYLAS. I am.
PHILONOUS. fell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving 
lights or colours, or in opening and' 'turning the eyes?
HYLAS. Without doubt, in the former.
PHILONOUS. Since therefore you are In the very perception of 
light and colours altogether passive, what Is become of that 
action you were speaking of, as an ingredient of every sensa- 
tion?3
We have no choice then but to see a particular object
as white or blue or whatever colour it may be, and similarly
with sounds, odours, etc. We receive certain sense Impressions
from without* As we saw before the things which appear to
cause these impressions are not the real causes since they are
purely passive but rather God Is their cause. *Now the set rules
or established methods, wherein the mind we depend on excites
in us the ideas of sense, are called the Laws of Natures and 
      -------------------
Mai., II, 196f. Warnock supports Berkeley on this 
point on page 206. *As he rightly points out in the First 
Dialogue. perception is not an action at all.*
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these we learn by experience which, teaches us that such and 
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas in the 
ordinary course of things.rt4
Since sensation is passive the Mexperiencert referred 
to in the quotation directly above nay imply something more, 
some active power by which we know these "Laws of Nature*.
What then do we know by sensation itself? Berkeley does very 
clearly hold that all knowledge begins with the senses, ap­
proving the scholastic axiom HNihil est in intellectu quod 
non prius fuit in sensu.H5
It appears however that the senses themselves do not 
knows ”sense knows nothing*. In the same work, Berkeley fur­
ther speaks of Mthe phenomena of nature which strike on the 
senses and are understood by the mind.*^ This quotation also 
Implies that the senses know nothing. On the other hand Berke­
ley does speak of the senses knowing effects or appearances,
?
Brine.. Part I, par. 50, (II, 53f).
5
B.C., par. 779, (I, 94). Cf. P.O., par. 559, (I, 67) 
*ffoolish £sicl in lien to despise the senses, if it were not 
.......the mind could have no knowledge, no thought at all.
All... , of Introversion, meditation, contemplation & spiritual 
acts as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from 
without by the senses are manifestly absurd.* Vide etiam De 
Motu, par. 21, (IV, 16).
6
Siris. par. 254, (V, 121).
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7
whereas reason deals with causes and is the guide to truth.
This passage from Siris seems to mean that we know 
ideas by sense and causes such as God and other spirits by- 
reason, which directly contradicts the position that sense 
knows nothing. Moreover, to speak of knowing *appearances" 
does not seem consonant with our knowledge of things as they 
are in themselves, a knowledge which Berkeley has emphasised. 
The term *appearances* suggests some more basic reality be­
yond sense qualities, such as material substance. This 
statement concerning senses dealing with appearances is islo- 
ated, and seems to have been made carelessly. Consequently
 7-------------------------------------------------------------
Siris. par. 253, (7, 120)i "Strictly the sense knows 
nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters 
/[letters J by sight; but we are not therefore said to under­
stand them." Tide e tiara par. 264, (7, 124), which has a strik­
ing similar!tyTcT*Pia'i'o. "Sense and experience acquaint us with 
the cause and analogy of appearances or natural effects. 
Thought, reason, intellect introduce us into the knowledge of 
their causes. Sensible appearances, though of a flowing, 
unstable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the 
mind, they do by an early prevention render the aftertask of 
thought more difficult; and, as they amuse the eyes and ears, 
and are more suited to vulgar uses and the mechanical arts of 
life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most 
men, to those superior principles, which are the later growth 
of the human mind arrived at maturity and perfection, but, 
not affecting the corporeal sense, are thought to be so far 
deficient in point of solidity and reality; sensible and real, 
to common apprehensions, being the same thing; although it be 
certain that the principles of science are neither objects of 
sense nor imagination, and that intellect and reason are alone 
the sure guides to truth." Of. A. A. Luce, "The Alleged De­
velopment of Berkeley’s Philosophy", Mind. Tol. HI, (Jan. 
1943). luce, for one, says on p. 150 that there is no change 
in Berkeley’s thought in Siris. He concludes his article,
"The alleged development of Berkeleian Philosophy has thus been 
examined and exposed. It is a flight of fancy, comparatively 
modern, without basis In fact." p. 156.
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we should not hold Berkeley to It but must consider senses 
knowing nothing as his preferred opinion on this subject.
Berkeley even gives the reason himself why we cannot 
be said to know appearances:
Colour, figure, motion, extension and the like, considered 
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, 
there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But if 
they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things 
or archetypes existing without the mind, then we are involved 
all In" scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the 
real qualities of things. ...All this scepticism follows from 
our supposing a difference between things and ideas, and that 
the former have a subsistence without the mind or inxperceived. 
It were easy to dilate on this subject, and shew how the argu­
ments urged by sceptics in all ages, depend on the supposition 
of external objects’.
Manifestly in this passage Berkeley rejects the idea that we
know only appearances and not the things themselves. What we
see are the sensible qualities which make up things and there
is nothing beyond this; this is reality* Hence the senses,
even though they know nothing, are struck by phenomena which
should not be called appearances, To say the senses know only
appearances involves us in skepticism* Bather the senses come
in contact with sensible things or ideas which in Berkeley’s
philosophy constitute reality.
In fact there is no distinction between sensation and 
9its object* For the object is that which Is immediately
perceived, which is also the definition of a sensation. The
    w       ------------------------------
Brine.. Part I, par. 87, (II, 78f.) The position 
attacked in tills quotation is that held by Locke. Tide An 
Bssav gone. Hum. Und., Bk. IT, Oh. IT, See. 8, 12 TfoT.Tl,
P. 25677^ 427X7
9
Dial.. II, 194-196,
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only remaining basis for distinguishing sensation and its 
object would be to predicate activity of sensation, but we 
have already seen that for Berkeley sensation is passive,
The trustworthiness of the senses is very emphat­
ically stated by Berkeley although for the unusual reason 
that the sensation and its object are identical. must
with the Mob place certainty in the senses*^ *0 and again,
"Let me be represented as one who trusts his senses, who 
thinks he knows the things he sees and feels and entertains 
no doubts of their existence,
The senses do provide us with material, so to speak* 
They are the starting-point in any knowledge. Therefore, 
even though they themselves do not, strictly speaking know, 
yet they do seem to be powers dr faculties which enable us 
to receive sense impressions. The fact that the senses do 
not have a choice when they perceive a particular thing does
not necessarily imply they are completely passive as Berkeley 
12maintains.
 w   ---------------------
P.O., par. 740, (I, 90).
11
Mai., II, 237f. Gf. P.O. par. 317, Cl, 39), par.
539, (I, 67);Princ.. Part I, par. 88, (II, 79).
12
St. Thomas Aquinas appears to hold for the passivity 
of the external senses. Busiaa Theoiogiae, (cura et studio 
Instituti Stuidiorum Mediaevalium, Ottaviensis, Ottawa, Canada, 
1941), I pars, ou, 78, art. 3, (Vol. I, p. 475b). wBst autem 
sensus quaedam potentia passiva, que nata est immutari ab 
exterior! sensibili. Bxterius ergo iiaiautativum est quod per se 
a sensu pereipitur et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitatae 
potentiae distinguuntur.* It could, however, be argued that 
the very power to receive sensations is itself a type of activ­
ity. If all our knowledge depends on sense to provide material 
for the understanding, then it seems that sense is doing some­
thing, that it is, to some extent, active.
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So far we hare only considered sense in man. Does
sense exist also in God? On this point Berkeley is most
explicit, "There is no sense nor sensory, nor anything like
sense or sensory in God. Sense implies an impression from
some other being and denotes a dependence in the soul which
hath it* Sense is a passion and passions imply imperfection.
God knoweth all things as pure mind or intellect but nothing
by sense nor in nor through a sensory.*'1''*
On this issue of sensation the Infinite Spirit is
radically different from all finite spirits. Man cannot know
anything without sense; God has no senses since they imply
passivity and imperfection. Moreover, the things we sense
are external to us, but not to God, for the reality of their
1 A.existence consists in being perceived by God, The word 
“perceived* cannot be identical with ’sensed** in this context 
since God does not in any way sense. It must refer to His 
knowledge of things. Even when “perception** is used in 
regard to us, that is, in regard to finite spirits, more than 
sensation is at times implied, since the senses do not pre­
cisely know and in some Instances perception appears to mean 
knowledge. Yet as we have already seen, Berkeley generally 
identifies perception and sensation. In at least one place, 
perception, sensation and thought are all lumped together as
--------- 13------------------------------------------------------------
Siris, par, 289, (?, 134).
14
VMe supra, p. 34.
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15meaning the same thing. Naturally then we will have diffi­
culty in deciding whether perception means sensation or
thought, and can only attempt to interpret as accurately as
3 6the context allows. The distinction between sensation and 
thought will also present difficulty. Such verbal imprecision 
is, as we have already observed, not rare in the writings of 
Berkeley.
Are the senses faculties distinct from the soul or 
mind in which they reside? Berkeley does speak, although he 
is somewhat obscure, of the external senses as distinct facul­
ties or powers. Moreover as we have tried to bring out, his
P.O. par. 299, (I, 37), "But say you the thought or 
perception I call extension is not itself in an unthinking 
thing or matter. But it is like something which is in matter. 
Well, say I, do you apprehend or conceive what you say extension 
is like unto or do you not. If the latter, how know you they 
are alike, how can you compare any things besides your own 
ideas, if the former it must be an idea i.e perception thought, 
or sensation which to be In an imperceiving thing is a Contra­
diction."
16
Of, Willis Doney, "Two Questions About Berkeley",
The Philosophical Review, LSI, (1952) p. 338f. Doney points 
out tliai Berkeley Is not consistent on the activity or passivity 
of perceptions. Doney does not give reasons for this inconsist­
ency but perhaps it is due to Berkeley’s use of the word "percep­
tion* to mean "sensation* in some instances and "knowledge"in 
others.
17
Siris, par. 303, (V, 140) "Though harmony and propor­
tion are not" objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are 
organs which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof 
she may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments 
of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the 
soulj and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent, 
we arrive at the highest."
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whole line of thought on the senses seems to indicate that 
they are powers or faculties. Berkeley himself, however, 
has not argued to this conclusion. We shall have to look 
at the other powers before we can answer this question more 
definitely, Then we shall be in a better position to ascer­
tain whether the soul or mind is distinguished from its 
faculties, whether the faculties are distinguished among them­
selves and finally whether powers are distinguished from oper­
ations. We might note that Berkeley does at least have a tend­
ency to maintain these distinctions, as his writings on the 
external senses indicate. But these distinctions are not 
made in the Cartesian tradition in which he is situated. 
Accordingly we can expect some confusion in his thought on 
the mind and its powers.
The only internal sense which is given any treatment 
by Berkeley is imagination, or Mfancy”, as he frequently calls 
it, and even here the amount of space devoted is relatively 
slight. In fact, Berkeley does not seem to be interested in 
imagination for its own sake; rather he wishes to explain how 
real and imaginary things are still distinguished within the 
framework of his thought,
”1 find that I can exite ideas in my mind at pleasure, 
and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no 
more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in 
my fancy* and by the same power it is obliterated, and makes 
way- for -anothcr.- This—making -and unteaking of ideas doth very
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properly denominate the mind active,*^® When we Imagine 
ideas we are active but is this activity purely volitional 
or is the imagination itself an active power?
In Siris. Berkeley writes, “Sense supplies images 
to memory, These become subjects for fancy to work upon,*^
By fancy he is very elearly referring to imagination but 
what does “work upon* imply? Although Berkeley does not de­
velop the point any further on this occasion, it does appear 
that the work done by the imagination is to frame Ideas which 
are of our own choosing rather than imposed upon us by an ex­
ternal agent. Consequently we could say that the imagination
20is an active power. The ideas which are summoned up by im­
agination are not however entirely new, but must have first 
been in sensation. They are new to the extent that we are not 
now sensing the idea invoked and indeed we may never have 
sensed this idea as such, Berkeley would probably say, for 
example, that we can have an image of a centaur or a phoenix 
by combining sensations in a way in which we have never expe-
18 '
Brine,, Bart I, par. 28, {II, 53).
19
Siris. par. 303, (V, 140).
20
Of. J. W. Bavis, “Berkeley’s Doctrine of the lotion* 
Review of Metaphysics. 12, (Har. 1959) p. 379. Davis feels 
that the idea's of Imagination do manifest the activity of the 
mind, although he does not make clear whether the imagination 
itself is an active distinct faculty in Berkeley. “Ideas of 
imagination are evidence of the activity of the mind in the 
sense that the mind is capable of compounding, dividing or 
barely representing those ideas originally received from sense
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rienced them. But the imagination ie nevertheless always
21dependent on previous sensation for its materials.
“The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of 
Nature are called real things: and those excited in the 
imagination being less vivid and constant, are more properly 
termed ideas or images of things, which they copy or repre­
sent The imagination depends on the senses which have as 
their object real things. Without this material from the 
senses the imagination cannot function. But it takes their 
material and frames at will hew ideas which copy the old 
ideas and which are not so vivid or coherent, since there is 
no necessary order or structure among them. They are subject 
to our own caprice.
The point which Berkeley wishes to make clear in his 
whole treatment of the distinction between objects of sense 
and objeets of imagination is that, although both are ideas, 
the distinction between real things and things which are the 
product of our own fancy remains: “There is a rerum naturae 
and the distinction between realities and chimeras retains its
• n -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Arnold observes that the imagination can only 
“compound and divide* what it has already received from sense, 
“the data of sense* as he puts it. p, 82,
22
Brine., Bart I, par, 33, (II, 54)*
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full force.**23
In reference to God, Berkeley makes no mention of 
imagination, not even to deny Its existence in Him, To try 
and deduce what Berkeley’s position should be in terms of 
his overall philosophy seems pointless for we surely cannot 
ascribe to Berkeley all that he ought to hold In the light 
of his principles. Whatever the merit of such a procedure, 
it would not be a treatment of his philosophy and accordingly 
we shall not attempt it.
We have seen that imagination and sensation are 
treated as two separate powers with distinct objects, namely 
images of things and real things. The further problem of 
distinguishing imagination from spiritual substance, we shall 
postpone until after we have dealt with understanding and will.
Since Berkeley’s remarks on understanding and will 
are so Interlaced, we shall treat both together where it is 
expedient to do so. **A spirit is one simple, undivided, active 
being: as it perceives Ideas, It Is called the understanding. 
and as It produces or otherwise operates about them, it is 
called the will. **24 The understanding Is presented here as the
--------- 23---------------------------------------------------- — --------
Brine.. Bart I, par. 34, (I, 55). In a parody of 
this W a m o o V  writes; "the distinction between realities and 
chimeras has not quite vanished, but it does not retain its full 
force.*1 Wamock quites correctly criticizes the inadequacy of 
Berkeley’s use of the vividness, coherence and order of ideas, 
as a criterion for distinguishing ideas of sense from those of 
imagination.
24
Brine.. Bart I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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power by which we perceive or know ideas* The word “percep- 
iiontt in this context clearly means knowledge* This process 
of knowledge is described by the Irish Bishop when he speaks 
of “the phenomena of nature which strike on the senses and 
are understood by the mind.” The understanding then must be 
active; it operates on the sense impressions and knows them.
The will on the other hand causes ideas, as Sod 
causes our ideas, or as we cause our own ideas of imagination.
All our ideas of sense would be caused by God, and not by our
own will. What is meant by “otherwise operating on ideas*1, 
is not made explicit by Berkeley. He could mean the combining 
of ideas or the abstracting of some quality and Its separate 
consideration. But since there is no distinction between an 
image and a concept as we saw in the first chapter, it is dif­
ficult to see how this combining and abstracting could be dis­
tinguished from the work of the imagination. It can be said at 
least that the will is active and its activity differs from that 
of the intellect, since it produces rather than perceives ideas.
On the distinction of the intellect from its ideas and
the will from its volitions, Berkeley is not consistent. In
the Philosophical Commentaries he speaks of “The understanding
not distinct from particular volitions’1^-* let later In the
same work he writes, ”1 must not say that the understanding
differs not from the particular Ideas, or the will from partic- 
    -------------------------------------------
P.O., par, 614, 615, (I, 76). Cf. P.O., par. 587,
(I, 13)*
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ular Ideas, or the will from particular volitions.*^ «^e in­
consistency cannot be explained away by having recourse to 
the disparity in earlier and later works. It involves the 
discussion of the spirit and its ideasj we shall return to It 
after we have treated the understanding and will in relation 
to spirit.
In Siris. Berkeley says the intellect Is distinguished
71from the will by operation. ' Neither the intellect wills
nor the will understands, although the will is conducted or
applied by the intellect. This alone would seem to demand
that the intellect and will are two distinct powers. For
each performs a different operation and both are expressly
28said to be active.
Moreover error is not said to be in the Intellect but
in the will, a position which is seemingly taken over from 
29
Descartes. Berkeley offers no explanation why error is in
the will rather than in the intellect. It Is quite possible
-
P.O., par. 848, (I, 101) This may represent a very 
early development within this one work.
27
Siris, par, 253, {7, 120).
28
Tide P.O.. par* 821, (I, 98) for understanding as 
active; parTTzi, (I, 76) for will as active.
29
Of. Descartes, Meditationes. Med. IT, (Tol. 711, 
p. 58). HUnde ergo nascuniur mei erroresT"Mempe ex hoc uno 
quod, cum latius pateat voluntas qua® intellectus ilia® non 
intra eosdem limites eontineo, sed eiiam ad ilia quae non 
intelligo extendoj ad quae cum sit indifferens, facile a vero 
& bono defiestit, atque Ita & fallor & peeeo.M
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
that Berkeley has been taught this Cartesian position and 
never bothered to question the point. However, it may well 
be that Berkeley’s connection of error and abstract ideas 
and error and will are related. Abstract ideas are a major 
source of confusion and error according to Berkeley. All 
skepticism and atheism would be shattered if they were re­
jected. Bit the mind cannot actually frame an abstract idea; 
this is an impossibility. Berkeley might mean that to try 
to use abstract ideas is an act of the will, not of the 
intellect. As in Descartes* explanation, the will would be 
going beyond its competence; it would be acting blindly, We 
cannot be certain of this relation between error and abstract 
ideas and error and vd.ll because Berkeley does not sufficient­
ly develop his position. We can see in any case that the dis­
tinction between intellect and will is supported further ay 
his remarks on the source of error.
But this distinction is not always maintained. Even in 
the Philosophical Commentaries Berkeley can says HThe under­
standing, desire, Hatred etc. so far forth as they are acts 
or active differ not, all their difference consists in their 
objects, circumstances, etc.*50 Since the objects of the 
intellect and will are different, will not their acts also be 
different and hence are they not distinct powers? In Siris. 
Berkeley does mention that philosophers commonly distinguish
 55----- --------------- --------------- --------------------------
P.O., par. 614a (I, ?6); par. 854, (I, 101),
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faculties according to their operations, but he fails to
31make clear whether or not he shares in this opinion.
Since he says that the intellect and will do not differ as 
active, it would seem that they could not be distinguished 
according to their operations. Yet he offers no explana­
tion as to why intellect and will do not differ as active 
or as powers when they have different objects.
The consideration of intellect and will in God may shed 
some light on our problem. BThere is in the Deity understand­
ing as well as will.8^  In the case of God there is no real 
distinction between his essence and his faculties. To speak 
of intellect and will in God Is anthropomorphic and cannot be 
understood in the strict literal sense. The distinction Is 
supposedly made to enable us to understand God better with 
our limited language and intelligence. Although Berkeley does 
not spell out such a doctrine In so many words, he would un­
doubtedly agree. But does he go farther and apply this to 
finite splints? Is there no real distinction for Berkeley 
between essence and faculties in all spirits, whether finite 
or infinite?
In the text which we used to introduce this portion of 
the chapter, Berkeley spoke of the spirit as it perceives
• Z 5
ideas and as it produces them. This could be a hint, an
 51-----------------------------~ ~ --------- ------------ ----
Siris. par. 254, (7, 121).
32
P.O., par. 812, (I, 97).
33
Brine.. Bart I, par. 27, (II, 52).
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indication, that Berkeley does not make any real distinc­
tion between the spirit and its faculties, although it 
could merely mean that the active being perceives or pro­
duces ideas through its powers which are really distinct. 
However Berkeley is more explicit elsewhere, HI must not 
mention the Understanding as a faculty or part of the Mind,
I must include Understanding & Will etc, in the word spirit 
by which I mean all that is active, *^4 Earlier in this sane 
work he writes s **fhe soul is the will properly speaking & as 
it is distinct from ideas,*^ 5
There is no interpretation of Berkeley’s remarks on 
intellect and will as distinct, or not distinct, from one 
another and as distinct, or not distinct, from spirit which 
can harmonize all the texts. However it does seem that his 
preferred opinion is to deny any real distinction either 
between intellect and will or between intellect and will and 
spirit. Besides the explicit statements noted above, this 
interpretation is further supported by Berkeley’s referring 
to understanding and will as abstract ideas, *1 must not say 
Will and Understanding are all one but that they are both 
Abstract, Ideas i.e* none at all* they not being even ratione 
different from the Spirit, Qua faculties, or Active.®^
^4 ~  '
P.O., par. 848, (I, 101).
35
B.C., par. 478a, (I, 60).m
36
B.C., par. 871, (I, 103). G» Arnold, commenting 
on this text and referring to Brine., Bart I, par. 27,
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If they are to be considered ideas at all, then 
surely intellect and xd.ll are abstract ideas according to 
Berkeley's understanding of the words. For we do not per­
ceive intellect and will by the senses, and can form no 
image of them. Consequently they would be for Berkeley 
abstract Ideas. But since they are active, it would seem 
that we should not speak of having Ideas of them at all, 
whether abstract or otherwise. Ideas apply only to passive 
things, but intellect and will do not belong to this Catego­
ry-
Following Berkeley's terminology we can strictly 
speaking only have "notions’* of Intellect and will, that is, 
we can know them from the effects we observe. Shis is the 
way we know the existence of other finite spirits. Me ob­
serve activities and argue back to a spiritual substance 
which causes them, Gould we analyse this activity and argue 
further that there are different faculties in spiritual beings 
each corresponding to a different mode of activity? Berkeley 
himself does not do so, although when he speaks of the various 
powers of spirits It does appear that he distinguishes them 
because he has experienced various activities in men. In 
summary we might observe that when Berkeley explicitly treats 
of the distinction between intellect and will, and intellect
( aI,~" 5’2), also tMhks that" the' soul' and’ its faculties" canjio’t 
be considered distinct in Berkeley. "Substance is only 
logically distinct from Its accidents", p. 90. fhis statement 
also" supports the view that there is no real distinction 
between the spirit and its faculties, p. 119d.
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and will and spirit he tends to deny any real distinction.
Yet when his whole treatment of spirit, intellect and will 
seems to imply that there are real distinctions, The former 
position would be a reflection of his Cartesianisa, the latter 
a more independent and more reasonable stand.
But if Berkeley really does identify spirit with its 
intellectual and volitional activities, and as we have seen 
that he probably does so, then it seems that his remarks on 
intellect and will are just so much idle verbiage. Bit not 
he himself call these words abstract ideas? For Berkeley 
what could be a more devastating criticism? And still he has 
not even taken the pains to explain, as he might, that these 
distinctions are made merely to facilitate our understanding 
and are not to be applied literally to reality. Of course, 
if intellect and will are abstract ideas, they will not even 
serve to help our understanding but would only add error and 
confusion.
There is another possibility offered by Berkeley al­
though it does not actually solve any problems. It is to 
identify the spirit with the will; the intellect with its 
ideas. There are indications in Berkeley that all activity
3'
involves the will and he says explicitly, '’the soul is will**,
This would entail admitting that none of the other powers are 
         — ■------ — - ■
Tide, P.O., par. 712, (I, 875 "The spirit the Active 
Thing that "which is Soul & God is the Vill alone Tine Ideas 
are effects impotent things,**
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active and that the essence of spirit or will is to be active. 
Such a position is consistent with Berkeley1 s remarks on spir­
itual substance which stresses activity as the key note. How­
ever, the other powers, at least the imagination and under­
standing, seem to involve activity and to be an essential part 
of spirit*
Furthermore to identify the intellect with its ideas
would seem to reduce intellect to the level of the external
senses which are merely acted upon but do not themselves know
or act in any way, Such a reduction does not harmonize with
Berkeley's treatment of understanding, although in one way the
understanding Is a sort of sense power, For the understanding
knows sense impressions and would be traditionally called a
sense power because of this, looked at from this point of view,
sensation would be both passive and active; passive in the case
of the external senses, active in the case of the understanding.
3ven so understanding is still active and cannot therefore be
*58identified with its ideas which are purely passive.
Sensation in its passive phase also seems to be dis­
tinct from the spirit or mind since it enables the mind to
--------- 3S---------------------------------------- - ------------------
luce thinks that Berkeley very emphatically distin­
guishes mind and ideas, *MInd is mind, for him, and ideas are 
ideas, and the Wain never merge. Hind is mind, for him, and 
ideas are not-mind. Mind and ideas, being intirely [sic] 
distinct, the two are two and are never one, Berkeleyts dec­
laration is coupled with hie first allusion to existence in 
the mind, and is all the more impressive on that account. It 
Is as if he meant to warn his readers that they are bound to 
misunderstand him unless they keep what is in the mind intirely 
distinct from the mind itself.* p. 51. W. honey believes that
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receive something* We can prescind at this point from the 
dispute over the activity or passivity of such a receptive 
power* Whether or not we call sensation* or rather the ex­
ternal senses, powers appears to he merely a verbal issue, 
hut the distinction of these senses from the spiritual sub­
stance is, in terms of Berkeley’s own thought, necessary.
To be more exact we should say, ail though this would not be 
according to Berkeley’s mode of expression, that man acts 
through his senses. But man could not do so if he were pure 
will.
The intellect and will must also be distinguished
from spirit or mind. For if the will is identified with
spirit, with the essence of man, then clearly there is no
room for any other type of activity in man. For if spirit is
will then it must be always willing and could do nothing else.
Similarly with intellect, and when Berkeley says the man is
59always thinking, he seems to be defending the position that 
man is a thinking thing. This radical view is dogmatically 
asserted, unverified by experience or by any form of argu­
mentation and seems strange for an empiricist,
this distinction is clear" in the Principle's. “v&iether "the" 
Huxnian passages in the Philosophical dommentarles can be 
adequately accounted for on the basis' of a change of termi­
nology or whether they express an earlier opinion that was 
discarded, there is no doubt that when Berkeley wrote the 
Principles, he meant to distinguish the mind and its ideas.* 
p.
P.O. par. 651, (I, 79) “Certainly the mind always 
& constantly thinks. ** Descartes had also defined man as 
thinking thing and should logically have held that man is
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In Siris. the distinction between the powers, al­
though not clearly delineated, is at least very definitely 
indicateds
The perceptions of sense are gross; hut even in the senses 
there is a difference. Though harmony and proportion are 
not objects of sense, yet the eye and the ear are organs 
which offer to the mind such materials by means whereof she 
may apprehend both the one and the other. By experiments 
of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of 
the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or 
ascent we arrive at the highest. Sense supplies images to 
memory. These become subjects for fancy to work upon.
Reason considers and judges of the imaginations, And these 
acts of reason become new objects to understanding. In this 
scale, each lower faculty naturally leads to the Deity, which 
is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of 
the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive. There 
runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings. 40
This is the only text in which any reference is made 
to a hierarchy of faculties. The lower faculties are said to 
assist the higher but the will is not even mentioned* Imag­
ination seems to have a role not elsewhere noted; a role as 
intermediary between the senses and the intellect even when 
the objects of sense are involved. The distinction between 
reason and understanding is not one usually employed by Berke­
ley, The whole passage suggests the influence of scholastic 
philosophy, which he does not generally accept. It would not 
be possible simply from this paragraph to determine with any 
precision just what each faculty does. The descriptions of 
their activities are too brief and sketchy to render fruitful
always txilhklhg' although" he 'does '"hot explicitly say so.
Tide Heditatlones, Med. II, (Vol. TO, p. 26).
40
Siris. par, 503, (V, 140).
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any such, attempt.
It is patent that Berkeley has not clearly thought
out his position on spiritual substance and its various
powers. He could have taken the facile but consistent method
of labeling all such discussions as abstract and empty* Such
a stand could be justified in terms of his philosophy but he
41did not choose this escape. He has talked about spirit, 
will, understanding etc. though in a sporadic manner, with 
some apparently contradictory statements, with undeveloped 
assertions and without attempting any overall harmony,
In reading his works an explanation for this confusion 
suggested itself and we have alluded to it earlier. Berkeley 
has glossed over the distinction between finite and infinite 
spirits. In God the distinction between his substance and 
his powers Is not real and often God is equated with his thought 
or his will etc. When applied to God such Identifications can­
not be disputed. But it Is certainly objectionable to do so 
with man.
Yet this Is what Berkeley has, in effect, done. Hot
that he explicitly says this, nor would he even accept such an 
        -------
Oolin I"!. Turbayne, "Berkeley's two Concepts of fTind* 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. XX, (Sept. 1959; 
presents' a very ihierest'ing view of two” concepts of mind which 
run through Berkeley’s thought, The first is that of mind as 
active, distinct from ideas, with intellect and will. This 
concept he feels is inconsistent with the rest of Berkeley’s 
system, p. 85. The second concept would consider the mind as 
substance to be metaphorical and the distinction of mind and 
its faculties as an abstract idea. This concept is supposedly 
latent in Berkeley’s thought and the one which he really held. 
Turbayne refers to P.O., par. 6J7, 658, 701, 777, 829I Brine.. 
Part I, par. 27; Ale. VIII, 28 to support this position, pp. §0- 
92.
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equation of man said God as spirit. However, if man is con­
sidered in this way, namely, if there is no real distinction 
"between his substance and his powers, then Berkeley’s state­
ments about man being will or ideas etc. make sense. That 
Berkeley has, in effect, done so is further supported by the 
fact that there is no distinction made between man and God as 
spirit, as active, or as will,
Even with this interpretation, all our problems are 
not solved. Sensation as well as imagination would remain 
unexplained in man. Nevertheless such an approach does appear 
to explain more of the numerous inconsistencies in Berkeley’s 
thought on this issue than any other. Moreover if Berkeley 
has unconsciously and unintentionally made man too much like 
God then certain insoluble difficulties will arise* For he 
does say things about man which will not apply to God; man is 
not purely active nor infinite, nor perfect. Hence the whole 
treatment of spirit and its powers will be charged with contra­
dictions because of two irreconcilable notions of man, both of 
which have influenced his thought.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the amount of space devoted to it, 
spiritual substance seems to be of secondary importance in 
Berkeley’s philosophy. Actually, however, spirits, whether 
infinite or finite, God or man, are of the utmost concern 
for Berkeley. C. M. Turbayne remarks on this point: '♦Very 
little attention has been given to Berkeley’s doctrine of 
mind either by Berkeley himself or by his critics. This is 
strange, because mind is the central concept in his system.*^
One of the reasons for the lack of material on spirits 
is, as we mentioned In the Preface, the loss of Part II of the 
Principles. There is no doubt that Berkeley intended to write 
this work, but the exact condition of the manuscript at the 
time of its loss cannot be ascertained. In the second letter 
to Johnson, Berkeley wrote: "As to the second part of xay trea­
tise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. the fact is 
I had made considerable progress in it; but the manuscript was 
lost about fourteen years ago, during my travels in Italy, and
 1      ---------
Art. cit.. p. 85. Vide etiaxn Bdward A. Sillera, George 
Berkeley and the Proofs for the Ikiistenoe of God, (Longmans,
Green and' Co.V Xonion, 19575, p.’ lO'lV Sillem expresses a similar 
thought: "He regarded the knowledge of spirits, of our own souls, 
and the souls of other people, rather than the knowledge of ideas, 
as being fundamental."
78
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I never had leisure since to do so disagreeable a thing as 
writing twice on the same subject.82 The phrase "considerable 
progress® is rather indefinite but at least it is clear that 
Berkeley did not produce a finished work on the subject. It 
may very well be that such an ex profeaso work was not pro­
duced chiefly because he was unable to resolve the conflicts 
in his thought.
His interest in spirits is manifested in his own con­
cern to combat skepticism and atheism, not merely for the sake 
of winning an argument, but to spread the positive doctrines 
of the existence of God and of the immortality of the soul.
The "Preface" to the Principles begins, "What I here make 
public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seem*d to me 
evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, particularly to 
those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration 
of the existence and immortality of God, or the natural immo­
rtality of the s o u l . I t  seem® patent that his real interest 
lies in God, and in man as a spiritual being, in spite of the 
fact that Part I of the Principles, (which is the only part 
extant), devotes very little space to these subjects.
What Berkeley wishes to do in the Principles and like­
wise In the Dialogues is to lay the foundation for the knowledge
I ' ’
Vol. II, p, 282. This letter was written in 1?29* Vide
etlaa Dial. II, 167 where he mentions the proposed Part II oT
tKe Principles.
3
Vol. II, p, 23.
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of spirits by digging out errors which dispose men toward 
skepticism and atheism. In his opinion, and it Is a reason­
able one, unless certain erroneous views are extirpated first, 
it is futile to proceed to the discussion of spiritual sub­
stance, Certainly this is good pedagogy, even if we do not 
agree with Berkeley on the question of which doctrines lead to 
skepticism and atheism. In the Principles in the form of a 
traditional philosophical treatise, and in the Dialogues in a 
more popular and entertaining manner, Berkeley is chiefly con­
cerned with the rejection of these fallaceous doctrines.
In our first chapter we dealt with these rejections, 
namely, the rejection of abstract ideas, the rejection of the 
absolute existence of sensible things apart from their being 
perceived (that is, of course, the esse est percipl principle), 
and the rejection of material substance* The rejection of 
abstract ideas is basic and is used to prove the other two 
positions. There is a definite development from the rejection 
of abstract Ideas, through the esse est percipi to the rejection 
of matter. This last rejection is the most important in the 
fight against atheism.^ Matter and God are mutually opposed 
as far as Berkeley Is concerned. If you accept matter and are 
consistent, then according to Berkeley you should be an atheist. 
But since God exists, (and the Bishop of Cloyne is certain that
? ' ' '
The Bullish Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, edited 
by A. Burtt, (lixlern library,' lew ‘fork, 1939), p. xix. *The 
chief support of atheism and scepticism, he ['BerkeleyJ thought 
was the current philosophical and scientific belief in a world
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he does), .matter has to go.
As has been seen the arguments used to establish 
these basic tenets are not entirely convincing, except perhaps 
to Hylas. But they do have a greater force when considered 
against the background of loeke’s philosophy. Moreover they 
are all tied up together and give a very strong coherence to 
the purgative side of Berkeley’s thought, The esse est percipi 
and the rejection of material substance are so closely allied 
that once you grasp the meaning of esse est percipi. the re­
jection of matter is evident. The rejection of abstract ideas 
prepares the way for both of these, not in the sense that either 
position is proved by it alone, but in the sense that both pre­
suppose tiois basic rejection,
Berkeley intends these initial doctrines as a pro­
paedeutic to the positive side of his philosophy— the realm of 
spirit, God and man. How well do these two parts fit together? 
Is there an overall unity in Berkeley’s thought? If we review 
our treatment of spiritual substance, we should be able to 
provide an answer to this problem. It is a problem which gets 
at the very heart of Berkeley’s philosophy.
In our second chapter the discussion began with Berke­
ley’s views on "notion”, the term he used to designate our know-
of‘ physical' matter IncVbpendent' of mind and' moving "in accordance
with its own mechanical laws”. Luce, Berkeley*s Imaaterlallsn. 
p. 71, as usual agrees with Berkeley tSa’t dod "and matter are 
incompatible. **It is possible to believe both in God and in 
matter but it is not easy to do so* The two beliefs where they 
are held together remain in a state of uneasy equilibrium; It 
is very hard to hold both beliefs together intelligently and 
firmly.”
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ledge of spirits as distinct from our knowledge of sensible
things which is through “ideas”« Motional knowledge is char-
5
acteriaed by its objects, rather than by its immediacy. By 
this type of knowledge we know self, other finite spirits, 
and God.** It might appear that “notion” is merely a verbal 
subterfuge used by Berkeley to bring into his philosophy some­
thing he should reject, namely, spiritual substance. However, 
suoh an Interpretation Is not entirely fair to Berkeley. It 
is true that “notion” is introduced as a convenient term to 
distinguish our knowledge of spirits from our knowledge of 
ideas. We sight also note that the “idea” Is the object, 
whereas the “notion* is not. In other words the “idea* is 
both the quo and quod of knowing, while the “notion” is only 
the quo. Still the term “notion”, however unsatisfactory it 
may be,does not alter Berkeley*s position with regard to spirits. 
He does not need this word, fhe question of the coherence of 
spiritual substance with his philosophy as a whole cannot be 
settled at this level*
fhe existence of self as a spiritual substance is really 
asserted, not proved. Berkeley does say, “We have a notion of
spirit from thought and action*”^  But he does not actually work
—  3  ---------------------------------------
Cf. J* 3. Davis, p. 383.
6
Motional knowledge has relations also as its object, 
but these do not pertain to our topic. Vide Prime.. Part I, 
par. 142, (II, 1055*i
7
girls, par. 290, (V, 135). Cf. D_e Motu par 10 (IV, 15); 
Sillem p. 110, “Berkeley held that the awareness we have of our 
own selves Is constituted by our experience both of the perceiving 
activity of our mind and the causal activity of our wills.”
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out a proof along these lines, fhe existence of other finite 
spirits depends on our acceptance of self as a spiritual sub­
stance. It would seem more consistent in terms of the rejec­
tion of abstract ideas and the esse est percipi principle to
reject spiritual substance also, fhis would leave self as a
8"congeries of perceptions" as Berkeley held earlier. As we 
indicated in Chapter II, to say any more than this seems incon­
sistent.
fhe proof for the existence of God is circular. It 
depends on the esse est percipi and God in turn is needed as 
a principle to support the esse est percipi. In other words, 
Berkeley has failed to demonstrate the existence of God philos­
ophically. God is, in effect, a postulate in his philosophy. 
Berkeley needs God to avoid skepticism. For If God does not 
exist, then only what is actually perceived by finite perceivers 
here and now, exists* fhis is an extreme position which Berke­
ley does not accept, but would it not be more consistent? Me 
will recall that Berkeley did not satisfactorily explain how 
things exist in God, In fact since he equated sensible things 
with ideas and ultimately with the ideas In the mind of God, 
hb should logically have been a pantheist. The rejection of 
God would eliminate this otherwise insoluble difficulty. Berke­
ley cannot accept God and also adequately distinguish him from 
the sensible world because of the way In which he interprets 
the esse est percipi.
0
P.O., par. 580, (I, 72).
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In dealing with the various faculties or powers of 
spirits, many problems were encountered, fhe exact funotlon 
of sense, imagination, understanding and will is difficult to 
discern. Are these faculties, for Berkeley, distinct from 
their operations? Are they distinct from one another? Are 
they distinct from the mind or spirit in which they reside?
It aeeras to he Impossible to give a definite answer to any of 
these problems. Berkeley does not offer a consistent expla­
nation! Indeed at times he contradicts himself,
If he followed his own rejection of abstract ideas, he 
would not even discuss the individual faculties since they are 
abstract ideas. Berkeley himself says this explicitly not 
only In the Philosophical goraraentaries. but also in the Prinol 
p l e a .  ^ Berkeley should regard the whole problem of the spirit 
and its faculties as just so many empty words.
Onoe he posits the existence of spiritual substance, he 
is besieged by problems whieh logically he should not consider. 
Moreover once he rejects material substance, he cannot consist­
ently hold for the existence of spiritual substance. He hold 
that material substance supporting its accidents did not make 
sense, yet he was unable to explain that he meant by a spiritual 
substance supporting its ideas. His attempts to show how the 
arguments against material substance do not apply to spiritual 
substance are weak and unconvincing. In terms of his basic
------- 5----------------------------    — ----- ---- ----
P.O.. par* 871. (I. 103); Brine,. Part I. par. 27 
(II, 52f.)j Vide etlam Alo, VIII, lS, (Til, 314),
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tenets, spiritual substance should also be discarded, as it is 
by Hume who also accepted these three fundamental positions.
Why it might be asked was Berkeley so inconsistent?
Why has he clung to two philosophies which are incompatible?
His basic principles are those of an empiricist philosophy.
So a large extent it would be true to describe the philosophy 
of the Logical Positivists as MBerkeley without GodM. On the 
other hand his desire to include Sod and finite spirits in his 
philosophy is a result of his Christian faith. There is it 
seems a conflict between Berkeley, the empiricist, and Berkeley, 
the Christian. Perhaps he himself was aware of this conflict 
in his earlier days when he wrote in the Philosophical Commen­
taries, ttio use utmost Caution not to give the least Handle of
10offense to the Church or Church—men.*
However, since he did set out to prove the existence
of God and to consider man as a spiritual being, it is more
probable that he was not conscious of this conflict while
writing M s  major pMlosophical works. Berkeley does not seem
to perceive this dichotomy in his thought, The conflict is
there nevertheless, rendering any overall unity in M s  pMlo-
--------- IS------------- - ---------------------------------------------
P.O., par. 715, (I, 87). Turbayne, p. 91f. inter­
prets this phrase and also P.%, par. 713, (I, 87) to support 
his contention that Berkeley really was consistent with his 
basic tenets and did not accept the doctrine of mind which 
harmonized with the Christian faith. According to Turbayne, 
Berkeley only presented this doctrine of spiritual substance 
so as to avoid giving offense to the Church, The evidence for 
this interpretation is not sufficient to warrant its acceptance. 
Berkeley seems to have been a sincere Christian all M s  life.
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sophy impossible. His thought can be reduced neither to an 
empiricism, nor to a doctrine on spirits. Both sides remain 
isolated in spite of his attempts to integrate then. His 
bold attempt to fight atheism and skepticism has not succeeded. 
Only his empiricism left its mark on 
goal of Bishop Berkeley’s philosophy
the future. The real 
has not been attained.
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